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I. Constitutional Law
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUBLIC EDUCATION-School District of
Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Education Ass'n, 667 A.2d 5 (Pa.
1995)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that there may be
circumstances when the fundamental right to a thorough and
efficient public education demands the subcontracting of teach-
ers.
In March of 1995, the Wilkinsburg Education Association (the
"Union") brought suit against the Wilkinsburg School Board (the
"Board").1 The Board wanted to subcontract the operation of
Wilkinsburg's Turner Elementary School to Alternative Public
Schools, Inc. ("APS"), and the Union sought to prevent the per-
formance of a contract between the parties.2 The contract was
enjoined without an evidentiary hearing.' The Board objected
and appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.4 In
July of 1995, the commonwealth court affirmed the injunction.'
In August of 1995, the supreme court granted allocatur and as-
sumed plenary jurisdiction.'
The supreme court first addressed the issue of the preliminary
injunction.7 The court held that the injunction was in error be-
cause there was insufficient evidence of irreparable harm that
the injunction prevented greater harm, or that the public inter-
est would be adversely affected if the injunction was not grant-
ed.'
As to the merits of the claim, the court held that if the con-
tract between the Board and APS was illegal under the Public
School Code, the Public School Code was illegal as applied to the
Wilkinsburg School District.9 Specifically, the court noted that
article III, section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution requires
1. School Dist. of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass'n, 667 A.2d 5, 6 (Pa.
1995).




6. Id. at 7.
7. Wilkinsburg, 667 A.2d at 7.
8. Id. (citing New Castle Orthopedic Ass'n v. Burns, 392 A.2d 1383 (Pa.
1978)).
9. Id. at 8. The opinion did not address the underlying question of the legali-
ty of the contract under the Public School Code. Id. (citing 24 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1-
101 to 27-2702 (1984)).
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a "thorough and efficient system of public education."" Because
the circumstances in Wilkinsburg were so severe," the court
stated that a prohibition against subcontracting teachers in that
district would inhibit the Board's ability to provide students
with a "thorough and efficient" education.
The court noted that public education is a fundamental right
and that the best interests of the students must always be of
primary concern. 3 The court remanded the case for an eviden-
tiary hearing and the preliminary injunction was vacated. "
Chief Justice Nix filed a dissenting opinion." He pointed out
that the Public School Code explicitly authorizes certain subcon-
tracting, indicating that subcontractors are not authorized with-
out an express provision." Further, the Chief Justice noted
that the court failed to establish a persuasive reason for ignor-
ing the underlying question of the legality of the contract under
the Public School Code. 7 Finally, Chief Justice Nix concluded
that the court's reasoning was "specious and wholly unpersua-
1218sive.
The majority correctly stated that education is a fundamental
right in Pennsylvania, and that any decision regarding educa-
tion must be guided by the best interests of the students. ' The
court also outlined various examples of the inexcusable failure to
provide Wilkinsburg's students with the "thorough and efficient"
education that they are constitutionally guaranteed."0 From
this, the court concluded that it may be constitutionally neces-
sary to subcontract teachers. This logic assumes that subcon-
tracting is in the students' best interest. It seems unlikely that
spending less money will better the system. The Wilkinsburg
10. Id. (citing PA. CONST. art. III, § 14).
11. Id. The Board alleged that the Wilkinsburg 1992 valedictorian graduated
with a 2.667 grade point average. Id. In the 1993-1994 school year, only one student
scored above the national average on the Scholastic Aptitude Test. Id. The fourth,
fifth and sixth graders at the Turner School had the worst performance of Allegheny
County students on standardized achievement tests in reading, math, language and
science. Id.
12. Wilkinsburg, 667 A.2d at 9 (citing PA. CONST. art. III, § 14).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 10 (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 11 (citing provisions of the Public School Code authorizing the sub-
contracting of food service programs, educational broadcasts, rehabilitative programs,
transportation, programs or tuition reimbursement for exceptional children, health
examinations, drug and alcohol programs, accountants, and attorneys).
17. Wilkinsburg, 667 A.2d at 11.
18. Id. at 12 n.1.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Id. at 8.
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School District does not have enough money to educate its chil-
dren, and the supreme court has held that it may be constitu-
tionally necessary to spend less.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUBLIC OFFICERS-HOME RULE-In re
Reese, 665 A.2d 1162 (Pa. 1995)-The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the state constitution specifically prohibits home
rule municipalities from recalling elected officials.
Gary Reese ("Reese") was elected mayor of Kingston, Pennsyl-
vania, in November of 1993.21 Pursuant to the recall provisions
of the Kingston Home Rule Charter, the Kingston Citizens for
Change filed a petition to have the question of the recall of
Reese presented on the May 1995 ballot.22 The petition was
field with the Luzerne County Board of Elections on March 6,
1995.23
Reese filed objections with the court of common pleas.24 On
March 29, 1995, the court set aside the petition for recall and
ordered the Board of Elections to leave the question of recall off
the May ballot on the grounds that the recall provisions of the
home rule charter were unconstitutional.'
The Kingston Citizens for Change filed an appeal with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in early April of 1995.26 The court
granted expedited review, and affirmed the court of common
pleas in late April of 1995.27
The issue addressed by the court was whether article VI,
section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution regarding the remov-
al of elected public officials applies to all elected officials.28 If
so, the court noted that the removal of elected officials is a pow-
er specifically denied to home rule municipalities.
29
The court began its analysis by stating two guiding principals:
first, that the acts of the legislature are presumed valid and that
a clear violation of the constitution is required to rebut the pre-
sumption; and second, that the authority of a home rule munici-
pality is presumed valid absent a specific constitutional restric-
21. In re Reese, 665 A.2d 1162, 1163 (Pa. 1995).
22. Reese, 665 A.2d at 1163.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. The court's decision was based on Citizens Committee to Recall Rizzo
v. Board of Elections, 367 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1976).
26. Id.
27. Reese, 665 A.2d at 1163. The court had jurisdiction under 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 722(7) (1991 & Supp. 1995).
28. Id. See PA. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
29. Reese, 665 A.2d at 1163. See PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
Vol. 34:553
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tion. ° In spite of these presumptions, the court held that the
recall provisions of the home rule charter were unconstitution-
al.
3 1
The court analyzed Citizens Committee to Recall Rizzo v.
Board of Elections,2 which involved a petition to recall the
Mayor of Philadelphia."3 The court noted that the Rizzo court
was unable to develop a majority rationale for its decision that
the recall provisions of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter
were unconstitutional.34
The court looked to the concurring opinion of Justice (now
Chief Justice) Nix, which held that article VI, section 7 of the
constitution provides the only means of removing all elected civil
officers." Following the Rizzo rationale, the court held that the
recall provisions exceeded the home rule authority granted by
article IX, section 2, because the recall provisions are expressly
prohibited by article VI, section 7.36
The Reese court removed any doubts about such provisions in
home rule charters that remained after Citizens Committee to
Recall Rizzo. The court correctly stated that any provisions in a
community's home charter must be consistent with the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF POW-
ERS-Commonwealth ex rel. Juliante v. County of Erie, 657 A.2d
1245 (Pa. 1995)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
attorney's fees may be awarded to the judiciary if it successfully
challenges conduct by another branch of government which
threatens its autonomy.
In 1985, Erie County challenged an order of the Erie County
Court of Common Pleas that appointed Thomas Antolik as Chief
Juvenile Probation Officer on the grounds that the appointment
violated the county's anti-nepotism policy.37 The court cited In
30. Reese, 665 A.2d at 1164 (citing Addison's Case, 122 A.2d 272 (Pa. 1956)
and County of Delaware v. Township of Middleton, 511 A.2d 811 (Pa. 1986)).
31. Id. at 1167.
32. 367 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1976).
33. Reese, 665 A.2d at 1165 (citing Rizzo, 367 A.2d at 233-34).
34. Id. (citing Rizzo, 367 A.2d at 233).
35. Id. (citing Rizzo, 367 A.2d at 232). See Milford Township Supervisor's Re-
moval, 139 A. 623 (Pa. 1927) (holding that the article VI, section 1 provisions for
creating elected offices indicate an ability to create methods of removal).
36. Reese, 665 A.2d at 1167.
37. Commonwealth ex rel. Juliante v. County of Erie, 657 A.2d 1245 (Pa.
1995) (citing In re Thomas P. Antolik, 501 A.2d 697 (Pa. Cornmw. Ct. 1985)).
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re Thomas P. Antolik,5 in which the commonwealth court held
that article V of the Pennsylvania Constitution mandates the
judiciary's control over the management of court-appointed per-
sonnel."5 Specifically, the court held that the public interest in
preventing nepotism, and the presumption that the County's
policy would have that desired effect, was less important than
the autonomy of the judiciary.'
In 1987, the president judge of the Erie County Court of Com-
mon Pleas entered an ex parte order requiring the County to
pay the court's attorney's fees.41 The order was appealed to the
commonwealth court, where it was vacated and remanded be-
cause the court held that the ex parte order violated due
process.4 As a result, the judges filed a complaint in manda-
mus demanding that the County pay the attorney's fees incurred
by the court of common pleas.' The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for the County and the Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court affirmed."
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the decision of the
commonwealth court and ordered the payment of attorney's
fees.45 To begin its analysis, the court stated that the Erie
County judiciary could not recover unless there was either statu-
tory authority or a persuasive reason to create an exception to
the general rule that attorney's fees are not recoverable."'
Section 3722 of the act governing the financial matters of the
judiciary states that county governments shall provide "all nec-
essary accommodations, goods and services" to the court sys-
tem.47 The court stated that the phrase "goods and services"
38. 501 A.2d 697 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
39. Juliante, 657 A.2d at 1247 (citing Antolik, 501 A.2d at 700). Article V of
the Pennsylvania Constitution provides for a unified judicial system. PA. CONST. art.
V.
40. Juliante, 657 A.2d at 1247 (citing Antolik, 501 A.2d at 700).
41. Id. at 1248. A law firm had sent an invoice to the court, and the judges
forwarded the bill to the County. Id. at 1247. The County refused to pay and the
bill was submitted to the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts for review,
where it was determined that the County was responsible for the debt. Id. at 1247-
48. The ex parte order followed. Id. at 1248. An ex parte proceeding is "[amny judi-
cial or quasi judicial hearing in which only one party is heard as in the case of a
temporary restraining order." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 576 (6th ed. 1990).
42. Juliante, 657 A.2d at 1248 (citing In re Thomas P. Antolik, 555 A.2d 273
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989)).
43. Id. at 1248. A complaint in mandamus is "the name of a writ (formerly a
high prerogative writ) which issues from a court of superior jurisdiction, and is di-
rected to . . . an inferior court, commanding the performance of a particular act
therein specified." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 961 (6th ed. 1990).
44. Juliante, 657 A.2d at 1248-49.
45. Id. at 1252.
46. Id. at 1249.
47. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3722 (1981). Section 3722 specifically states:
Vol. 34:553
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could be interpreted to include attorney's fees, but noted that it
was not appropriate to conclude that the statute authorized the
payment.' Specifically, the court held that this was an unusual
expense, and that the legislature would not have contemplated
the necessity of routine actions by the judiciary to protect its
autonomy.49
The court did find, however, that the payment of the fees was
mandated by the constitutional separation of powers.50 The
court distinguished two recent cases, one regarding attorney's
fees for an action by the Carbon County Court of Common Pleas
to compel disbursement of salary funds from the salary board,5'
and the other regarding a county salary board's refusal to recog-
nize a request for a five percent salary increase for court em-
ployees. 2 Specifically, the court stated that neither case was
brought by the judiciary to protect its own autonomy, neither
established the reasonable necessity of the funding requests, and
neither case was successful.53
In this case, the court reasoned, the inherent power of the
judiciary, held to be implicit in the co-equal branch scheme, was
threatened by another branch." The court further stated that
the judiciary should not be forced to spend limited resources
maintaining its co-equal status.55 The court, therefore, reversed
the summary judgment and remanded the case to the trial court
for a determination of the reasonableness of the attorney's
fees.'
Juliante is important because it protects the judiciary's auton-
omy in hiring its personnel, but courts must still bear the costs
of demanding the salary increases to maintain them.
Except as otherwise provided by statute, each county shall continue to furnish
to the court of common pleas and community court embracing the county, to
the minor judiciary established for the county and to all personnel of the
system, including central staff entitled thereto, located within the county, all
necessary accommodations, goods and services which by law have heretofore
been furnished by the county.
Id.
48. Juliante, 657 A.2d at 1249.
49. Id. at 1250.
50. Id. at 1252.
51. Id. See Lavelle v. Koch, 617 A.2d 319 (Pa. 1992).
52. Juliante, 657 A.2d at 1251. See Snyder v. Snyder, 620 A.2d 1133 (Pa.
1993).
53. Juliante, 657 A.2d at 1250.





CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION-Magazine
Publishers of America v. Commonwealth, 654 A.2d 519 (Pa.
1995)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the applica-
tion of a sales tax to magazines violates neither the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution nor article I,
section 7 of the state constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-UNIFORMITY OF
TAXATION-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that it is
legitimate and reasonable to distinguish between magazines and
newspapers in applying a sales tax on personal items.
The Magazine Publishers of America (the "Publishers") sought
declaratory and injunctive relief from certain provisions of the
Tax Code on several constitutional grounds. 7 First, the Pub-
lishers argued that an amendment to the Tax Code which elimi-
nates a sales tax exemption for magazines, but not newspapers,
violates the First Amendment to the Constitution. ss The court
held that while content-based taxation is constitutionally prohib-
ited, the amendment provides for the taxation of all magazines
regardless of content,59 and further that the tax does not uncon-
stitutionally target the press.6"
Next, the court addressed the argument that the tax violates
the free speech provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution."'
The court held that because the distinction between newspapers
and magazines is based on frequency of publication and format,
and not on content, the tax does not violate the state constitu-
tion. 2
Finally, the court addressed the Publishers' claims under the
57. Magazine Publishers of America v. Commonwealth, 654 A.2d 519 (Pa.
1995).
58. Magazine Publishers of America, 654 A.2d at 520. The amended provision
states that the sales tax "shall not be imposed upon . . . (30) The sale at retail of
newspapers." 72 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7204(30) (Supp. 1995). The First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution protects the freedom of the press. See U.S.
CONST. amend I.
59. Magazine Publishers of America, 654 A.2d at 523.
60. Id. at 524.
61. Id. Article I, section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states in part:
The printing press shall be free to every person who may undertake to exam-
ine the proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of government, and no
law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The free communication
of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every cit-
izen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for
the abuse of that liberty.
PA. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
62. Magazine Publishers of America, 654 A.2d at 524.
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equal protection provisions of both the state and federal consti-
tution, and the uniformity clause of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion." The court stated that none of the relevant provisions
require exact uniformity.' Instead, the court noted, the distinc-
tion must be legitimate and reasonable.' Here, the court rea-
soned, the newspaper exemption is justified as providing low
income citizens with an inexpensive, current news source.66
A dissenting opinion pointed out that the court lost an oppor-
tunity to provide Pennsylvania citizens with the broader free-
dom of expression provisions provided under the state constitu-
tion.67 As noted by the dissent, the majority failed to reconcile
the specific language of the Pennsylvania guarantee that "no law
shall ever be made" to inhibit speech with its decision."
II. Governmental Immunity
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TORT
CLAIMS ACT-SIDEWALK EXCEPTION-Finn v. City of Philadel-
phia, 664 A.2d 1342 (Pa. 1995)-The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the "sidewalk exception" is not applicable in a
situation where a foreign substance found on the sidewalk re-
sulted in injury to an individual.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the decision of
the commonwealth court and held in Finn v. City of Philadel-
phia9 that the "sidewalk exception" to the Political Subdivision
Tort Claims Act (the "PSTCA) 7 is not applicable in a situation
where a foreign substance on the sidewalk resulted in injury to
63. Id. at 525. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Pennsylvania Constitution
equal protection clause states: "Neither the Commonwealth nor any political subdi-
vision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discrim-
inate against any person in the exercise of any civil right." PA. CONST. art. 1, § 26.
Finally, Pennsylvania's uniformity provision states: "All taxes shall be uniform, upon
the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the
tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws.' Id. at art. 8, § 1.
64. Magazine Publishers of America, 654 A.2d at 526.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 526 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
69. 664 A.2d 1342 (Pa. 1995).
70. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8541-8564 (1990 & Supp. 1995).
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an individual.7"
The plaintiff, Mary Finn ("Finn"), was walking along Vine
Street in Philadelphia when she slipped on grease on the side-
walk and fell.72 The accident resulted in injuries and Finn
brought a personal injury action against the City of Philadel-
phia.73 The City asserted the defense of governmental immu-
nity74 and moved for summary judgment.6  Summary judg-
ment was denied, the case was tried, and judgment was entered
for Finn in the amount of $203,500.76 The Pennsylvania Com-
monwealth Court reversed on appeal and held that an accumu-
lation of a foreign substance, namely grease, on a city sidewalk
does not constitute a "dangerous condition of sidewalks" suffi-
cient to impose liability on a political subdivision.77
Finn's argument was premised on the belief that grease on
the sidewalk constituted a dangerous condition and thus the
71. Finn, 664 A.2d at 1346.
72. Id. at 1343.
73. Id.
74. Id. Governmental immunity or sovereign immunity is defined as:
A judicial doctrine which precludes bringing suit against the government with-
out its consent. Founded on the ancient principle that "the King can do no
wrong," it bars holding the government or its political subdivisions liable for
the torts of its officers or agents unless such immunity is expressly waived by
statute or by necessary inference from legislative enactment.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
75. Finn, 664 A.2d at 1343. Summary judgment is defined as a "[p]rocedural
device available for prompt and expeditious disposition of controversy without trial
when there is no dispute as to either material fact or inferences to be drawn from
undisputed facts, or if only question of law is involved." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1435 (6th ed. 1990).
76. Finn, 664 A.2d at 1343.
77. Finn v. City of Philadelphia, 645 A.2d 320, 325 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994),
affid, 664 A.2d 1342 (Pa. 1995). See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(b)(7). Section 854-
2(b)(7) states:
(b) Acts which may impose liability.-The following acts by a local agency or
any of its employees may result in the imposition of liability on a local agen-
cy:
(7) Sidewalks-A dangerous condition of sidewalks within the rights-of-
way of streets owned by the local agency, except that the claimant to
recover must establish that the dangerous condition created a reasonably
foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred and that the
local agency had actual notice or could reasonably be charged with no-
tice under the circumstances of the dangerous condition at a sufficient
time prior to the event to have taken measures to protect against the
dangerous condition. When a local agency is liable for damages under
this paragraph by reason of its power and authority to require installa-
tion and repair of sidewalks under the care, custody and control of
other persons, the local agency shall be secondarily liable only and such
other persons shall be primarily liable.
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exception was applicable.78 In analyzing Finn's argument, the
supreme court held that it would be erroneous to focus on the
word "of' rather than the word "on" in the sidewalk exception to
the PSTCA.7" The court noted that emphasis should be placed
on an analysis of the legislative intent regarding the "dangerous
condition" phrase in the PSTCA.8 ° Conversely, the City argued
that in order for Finn to prevail, the claim against the City must
establish an artificial condition or defect of the sidewalk."' The
City further argued that because the grease did not derive or
originate from the sidewalk, there was no defect.82 Therefore,
the City argued, as a matter of law it was not liable to Finn.8"
The supreme court noted that the intent of the legislature had
been to provide for immunities.' The supreme court has held
that exceptions to immunities must, therefore, be strictly inter-
preted." The court noted that it has consistently held that the
rule of immunities can only be waived if the defect or the condi-
tion of the land itself causes an injury.8" Therefore, the court
held that foreign matter found on a city sidewalk would not
subject a city to liability under the "sidewalk exception" to the
PSTCA.8"
The supreme court ultimately concluded that governmental
liability exists only in situations when an injury results from a
condition deriving or originating from the government's real-
ty.' Therefore, the court held that Finn was unable to estab-
lish a defect of the sidewalk itself and only alleged a dangerous
condition on the sidewalk." The supreme court concluded that
78. Finn, 664 A.2d at 1343.
79. Id.
80. Id. See supra note 77 for text of 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(b)(7).
81. Finn, 664 A.2d at 1344. The City asserted:
[C]laims involving government property must establish an artificial condition
or defect of the property itself, and that an actionable dangerous condition of
government property must derive, originate from, or have as its source the
property in question and may not arise from a source outside the property.
Id. at 1343-44.
82. Id. at 1344.
83. Id.
84. Id. See The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 8541-8564; see also The Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8521-
8528 (1990 & Supp. 1995).
85. Finn, 664 A.2d at 1344. See generally Snyder v. Harmon, 562 A.2d 307
(Pa. 1989) (holding that the statutory language of the PSTCA requires that a dan-
gerous condition must originate in the realty); Mascaro v. Youth Study Ctr., 523
A.2d 1118 (Pa. 1987) (holding that the real estate exception is applicable only in
situations where a defect of the property resulted in injury).
86. Finn, 664 A.2d at 1345.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1346.
89. Id. The supreme court stated: "In the language of the statutory exception
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the commonwealth court correctly applied the statutory excep-
tion set forth in the PSTCA and therefore, affirmed the decision
of the commonwealth court."
Finn clarifies that the sidewalk exception is not applicable in
situations where foreign materials or substances on the sidewalk
result in injury. The sidewalk itself must contain a defect suffi-
cient to result in an injury for the exception to the PSTCA to
apply.
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TORT
CLAIMS ACT-SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ACT-Jones v. Chieffo, 664
A.2d 1091 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995)-The Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court held that summary judgment is improper when
reasonable jurors could find that intervening criminal acts of a
third party should have been foreseeable as to municipal defen-
dants, whose negligence was a substantial contributing factor in
a resulting motor vehicle accident.
In Jones v. Chieffo,9 ' the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
held that a trial court errs in granting summary judgment when
there exists genuine issues of material fact that a municipal
defendant's conduct is a substantial contributing factor in caus-
ing a motor vehicle accident.2 Therefore, municipal defendants
are not entitled to absolute immunity resulting in a judgment as
a matter of law in all tort actions where criminal conduct of an
intervening third party causes, in part, the resultant accident."3
In Jones, Kent Jones ("Jones") individually, and as Adminis-
trator of the Estate of Bridgett Jones, his deceased wife, filed
wrongful death and survival actions against Officer Charles
Chieffo ("Chieffo"), Commissioner Williams, Mayor Wilson, the
City of Philadelphia and the City of Philadelphia Police Depart-
ment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania.94 The action was subsequently transferred to
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.9" In con-
junction with the proceedings in district court, the parties stipu-
to governmental immunity, the dangerous condition was on the sidewalk, not of the
sidewalk, and thus is insufficient to create liability in the city." Id.
90. Id.
91. 664 A.2d 1091 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
92. Jones, 664 A.2d at 1096.
93. Id. at 1095.
94. Id. at 1092.
95. Id. The action was transferred to state court after discovery and summary
judgment proceedings had been conducted. Id.
564 Vol. 34:553
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lated that if Chieffo's police car had a working siren, then Jones
would have heard the siren and potentially would have avoided
the accident. 96 The parties further stipulated that the Philadel-
phia Police Department was aware that several of its police
vehicles did not have operational sirens.97
Chieffo testified by deposition that he was in pursuit of three
vehicles and while in pursuit he heard a gunshot that came from
one of the three vehicles." Chieffo activated the vehicle's dome
lights and attempted to activate the siren, but found it to be
non-operational.9 Chieffo advised his supervisor of the pursuit
and continued in pursuit for approximately thirteen blocks."
The second and third vehicles ran a red light.10' The third ve-
hicle collided with Jones in the intersection and the collision re-
sulted in the death of Jones' wife.0 2
Police Lieutenant Herbert Groscsik testified that as a result of
concern by the police department over liability stemming from
pursuits, the department issued Directive 45."0 Directive 45
requires that all pursuits be reported to an acting supervisor for
a determination of whether or not pursuit should be contin-
ued.' ° Additionally, all patrol cars were to have functional si-
rens. 
105
The trial court relied on Foster v. City of Pittsburgh"° in
granting summary judgment for the municipal defendants. 7
In Foster, the court held that even if an officer did not have the
vehicle's siren on during a pursuit, this fact in and of itself does
96. Id.
97. Jones, 664 A.2d at 1092.
98. Id. at 1092-93. Chieffo was initially investigating a report of vehicle prop-
erty damage when he observed the three vehicles disregard a stop sign. Id. at 1092.
99. Id. at 1092.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Jones, 664 A.2d at 1092-93. Jones testified by deposition that as he en-
tered the intersection he looked to the right and saw the car followed by the police
vehicle. Id. at 1093. The police vehicle had its lights on. Id. Jones estimated the
speed of both vehicles at approximately 70-80 miles per hour. Id. Jones applied his
brakes, but was unable to avoid contact with the vehicle. Id.
103. Id. at 1093. Directive 45 became effective on August 26, 1985. Id. This
was notably more than four years prior to the date of the instant action. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. Police Captain Thomas Doyle testified that the pursuit should have
been terminated by the supervisor because Chieffo's police vehicle did not have an
operational siren. Id.
106. 639 A.2d 929 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal denied, 648 A.2d 791 (Pa. 1994)
(holding that the criminal act of a driver is a superseding cause sufficient to absolve
a city of liability, despite the fact that an officer failed to comply with the vehicle
code in not activating the vehicle's siren and warning lights during pursuit).
107. Jones, 664 A.2d at 1093.
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not establish negligence on the part of a city.08 In Jones, the
trial court further held that a criminal act of fleeing a pursuing
police vehicle acts as a superseding cause sufficient to preclude
any possible liability of a city.' °9
On appeal, Jones argued that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment in light of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's decision in Powell v. Drumheller."' In Powell, it was
alleged that the Department of Transportation (the "DOT") neg-
ligently designed a road because the road lacked center mark-
ings and shoulders."' The supreme court held that it did not
necessarily follow that any criminal violation is automatically a
superseding cause."
The commonwealth court, noting the supreme court's decisions
in Fisher and Powell, concluded that municipal defendants are
not entitled to "blanket" immunity for all tort claims when inju-
ries are caused to a victim by intervening criminal conduct of a
third party."3 The court stated that it was for the jury to de-
termine that if the police vehicle had an appropriately function-
ing siren, then the Jones' vehicle would not have entered the
intersection."4 The court noted that if the jury determined that
the conduct of the third party was a substantial contributing fac-
tor in the resulting injuries, the jury must then determine if the
conduct was so unusual as to be unforeseeable."' If the con-
duct was deemed unforeseeable, the court stated that it would
constitute a superseding cause sufficient to preclude liability on
the part of the City."6 Therefore, the court held that it was er-
ror for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of the
City and the commonwealth court reversed and remanded."17
The commonwealth court in Jones clarified the issue of a
municipal defendant's liability and lack of absolute immunity in
108. Foster, 639 A.2d at 932.
109. Jones, 664 A.2d at 1093.
110. Id. See Powell v. Drumheller, 653 A.2d 619 (Pa. 1995) (holding that negli-
gence of the Department of Transportation (the DOT") is an issue for the jury as is
the issue of negligence of an intoxicated driver constituting a superseding cause
sufficient to preclude liability of the DOT).
111. Powell, 653 A.2d at 621. Powell alleged that the DOTs negligent design of
London Tract Road led to the death of her husband. Id.
112. Id. at 624. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: "[W]e do not agree
that any violation of a criminal statute constitutes a superseding cause. Instead, the
proper focus is not on the criminal nature of the negligent act, but instead on
whether the act was so extraordinary as not to be reasonably foreseeable." Id.
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situations where criminal conduct by a third party has resulted
in injury. Municipalities will no longer be able to rely on a
shield of absolute immunity in situations similar to Jones.
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TORT
CLAIMS ACT-REAL PROPERTY EXCEPTION-Grieff v. Reisinger,
654 A.2d 77 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995)--The Pennsylvania Com-
monwealth Court held that the real property exception to gov-
ernmental immunity does not apply to injuries resulting from
the alleged mishandling of combustible liquids by a volunteer
fire association and its chief.
In Grieff v. Reisinger"' the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court held that the real property exception to the Political Sub-
division Tort Claims Act (the "PSTCA")"9 is not applicable in a
situation where the alleged injuries occurred due to negligent
use of combustible liquids on a fire station floor, rather than due
to a defect or to the condition of the floor itself. °
In Grieff, members of the Emlenton Volunteer Fire Associ-
ation (the "EVFA") assembled at the fire station for the purpose
of organizing and cleaning tools for placement on a new fire
vehicle." Robert Grieff ("Griefi') was the chief of the
EVFA.' Marlene Reisinger ("Reisinger") was a personal friend
of Grieff and had been invited into the fire station while on her
way home from work.' Reisinger participated in the cleaning
118. 654 A.2d 77 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
119. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8541-8542 (1982 & Supp. 1995). Section 8541
states: "Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be
liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by
any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person." Id. § 8541.
Section 8542(b)(3) states:
The care, custody or control of real property in the possession of the local
agency, except that the local agency shall not be liable for damages on ac-
count of any injury sustained by a person intentionally trespassing on real
property in the possession of the local agency. A [sic] used in this paragraph,
"real property" shall not include:
(i) trees, traffic signs, lights and other traffic controls, street lights and
street lighting systems;
(ii) facilities of steam, sewer, water, gas and electric systems owned by




120. Grieff, 654 A.2d at 80. The court stated: "It was not the floor of the fire
station itself that caused Marlene Reisinger to be injured, Mrs. Reisinger received
her injuries when she was engulfed in the flames of a fire which ignited from the
alleged negligent mishandling of combustible liquids." Id.
121. Id. at 78.
122. Id.
123. Id. Reisinger decided to stay at the station to watch television and drink
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and painting of the fire vehicle equipment. 124 While cleaning
the floor with paint thinner, Grieff caused the thinner to flow
under a refrigerator and the thinner ignited.2 ' Reisinger, who
was standing nearby, was engulfed in flames. 26
Reisinger and her husband initiated a negligence action
against Grieff and the EVFA, alleging negligence on the part of
both.' Grieff and the EVFA filed an answer and new matter
and raised the defense of sovereign immunity.'28  The
Reisingers filed a reply to new matter which merely reiterated
the allegations set forth in the complaint.29 Grieff and the
EVFA filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting immunity
under the PSTCA."' Grieff and the EVFA further asserted
that the Reisingers failed to plead one of the specific exceptions
to the PSTCA."'
Reisinger, in a brief in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, asserted for the first time the real property exception
to the PSTCA.132 The trial court denied the motion for summa-
ry judgment and held that the Reisingers were not required to
specifically plead the real property exception."
On appeal, Grieff and the EVFA asserted that neither the
complaint nor the reply to new matter were sufficient to estab-
lish that the accident resulted from a defect or dangerous condi-
tion of the floor."3 The commonwealth court noted that it is
well-established under Pennsylvania law that the real property
exception is inapplicable in situations where an injury is not
caused by the condition of the property; but rather, the danger-
ous condition merely facilitates the injuries. 3 ' The court stated
beer with the fire fighters. Id.
124. Id.
125. Grieff, 654 A.2d at 78. Grieff was cleaning the floor near the kitchen
where excess from earlier spray painting collected on the floor. Id. Grieff poured
paint thinner on the floor and attempted to brush it with a broom, resulting in the




128. Id. at 79. See supra note 119 for the text of §§ 8541 and 8542.
129. Grieff, 654 A.2d at 79.
130. Id.
131. Id. See generally 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542 (setting forth the specific ex-
ceptions to the PSTCA).
132. Grieff, 654 A.2d at 79. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(b)(3).
133. Grieff, 654 A.2d at 79. The trial court concluded: "[S]uch an allegation
brings the conduct within the real property exception without the need to specifically
plead the exception." Id.
134. Id. at 80.
135. Id. See Mascaro v. Youth Study Ctr., 523 A.2d 1118 (Pa. 1987). The court,
citing Mascaro, stated: "The exception will not apply where the injury is merely 'fa-
568 Vol. 34:553
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that the alleged negligent act must be a direct result of the
condition of the property. 
136
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently reaffirmed the
principles set forth in earlier cases in Kiley v. City of Philadel-
phia."7 In Kiley, the court stated that it is clearly defined in
Pennsylvania jurisprudence that a negligent act must arise from
an actual defect.'38 Immunity can be waived only in those situ-
ations where it has been specifically alleged that the defect re-
sulted in the injury.'39
In Grieff, the commonwealth court indicated that the
Reisingers failed to allege that the injury was a result of a defect
in the fire station property.'4 The court stated that it was no-
table that the floor did not cause the injuries to Reisinger, but
rather, the injuries were caused by the alleged actions of Grieff
and the EVFA.'4 ' Because no allegations of a defect were as-
serted, the court held that the present cause of action did not
fall within the purview of the real property exception to the
PSTCA." Therefore, the commonwealth court held that the
trial court erred in denying summary judgment for Grieff and
the EVFA.14
The commonwealth court's decision in Grieff affirms the well-
established principle of Pennsylvania law that an actual defect
must exist that creates or causes the injury. Negligence without
a defect is not sufficient to invoke the real property exception to
the PSTCA.
cilitated' by the dangerous condition of the real property and not caused by the
dangerous condition of the real property itself." Grieff, 654 A.2d at 80 (citing
Mascaro).
136. Grieff, 654 A.2d at 80. See Houston v. Central Bucks Sch. Auth., 546 A.2d
1286 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), allocatur denied, 562 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989).
137. 645 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1994) (holding that the City of Philadelphia was not
liable to an injured party who was injured in the street while avoiding sidewalk
construction because the sidewalk was not defective).
138. Kiley, 645 A.2d at 187.
139. Id.
140. Grieff, 654 A.2d at 80. The court noted:
To the contrary, the Reisingers allege in the pleadings that . . . [Griefis and
the EVFA's] negligent conduct alone, albeit in the process of caring for local
agency real property, caused the injuries. Nothing in the pleadings or in the
record indicate that Mrs. Reisinger's injuries were caused by anything other
than the negligence of appellants in mishandling combustibles.
Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542.
143. Grieff, 654 A.2d at 80.
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III. Tort Law
TORTS-WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL ACTIONS-DISCOVERY
RULE-Baumgart v. Keene Building Products Corp., 666 A.2d
238 (Pa. 1995)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in an evenly
divided opinion, affirmed the decision of the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania and held that as a matter of law, if the existence
of an injury could be reasonably ascertained within the pre-
scribed statutory period, the discovery rule is inapplicable and
summary judgment is appropriate.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held in Baumgart v.
Keene Building Products Corp.'" that as a matter of law, if the
existence of an injury could be reasonably ascertained within the
prescribed statutory period, the discovery rule is inapplicable
and summary judgment is appropriate.'"
In Baumgart, Anthony Baumgart (the "decedent") was alleg-
edly exposed to asbestos materials from 1950 to 1980 while
employed by Witco Chemical Corporation.' In January of
1985, the decedent was diagnosed with mesothelioma.'4 7 The
decedent and his wife were advised of the diagnosis in January
of 1985." The decedent repeatedly denied exposure to asbes-
tos. ' The decedent died on March 31, 1985 from mesothelio-
ma and related pulmonary complications."'
The decedent's wife filed a petition under the Worker's Com-
pensation Act five months after the decedent's death.'' On
March 26, 1987, the decedent's wife filed survival and wrongful
death actions against a variety of manufacturers and suppliers
of asbestos-containing products.'52 The trial court held that
both the survival and wrongful death actions were barred by the
applicable two year statute of limitations period for personal
144. 666 A.2d 238 (Pa. 1995).
145. Baumgart, 666 A.2d at 240.
146. Id. at 239.
147. Id. at 239-40. In January of 1985, the decedent underwent a fiberoptic
bronchoscopy. Id. The procedure enabled the decedent's physician to take a pleural
biopsy. Id. at 240. The biopsy revealed the presence of mesothelioma which is a rare
form of cancer which generally results from exposure to asbestos. Id.
148. Id. at 240.
149. Id.
150. Baumgart, 666 A.2d at 240. The decedent had been hospitalized between
February 13, 1985 and March 9, 1985. Id. The decedent's diagnosis was confirmed
during this period. Id. The decedent reentered the hospital on March 19, 1985 and
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injury.5 ' Therefore, summary judgment was granted in favor
of all manufacturers and suppliers. 54
The superior court reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for the wrongful death claim and affirmed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for the survival action. 5'
The supreme court granted allocatur156 to determine whether
the survival action, as a matter of law, was barred by the appli-
cable statute of limitations.'5 7
The supreme court's Opinion in Support of Affirmance began
with a discussion of the discovery rule.5 8 The court noted that
the decedent and his wife actually knew of the injury and the
causative agent within the limitations period.159 The court, ref-
erencing its prior decision in Pocono International Raceway, Inc.
v. Pocono Produce, Inc.,"' noted that a statute of limitations
begins to run as soon as the right to maintain a cause of action
arises."' The court noted that the discovery rule acts to miti-
gate the harsh effects of the statute of limitations." 2
However, the court opined that in the instant action the dis-
covery rule was inapplicable because the cause of the injury was
153. Id. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524(2) (1990) (providing that "[tihe following
actions and proceedings must be commenced within two years: . . . (2) [a]n action
to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death of an individual
caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of anoth-
er.").
154. Baungart, 666 A.2d at 240.
155. Id. See Baumgart v. Keene Building Prods. Corp., 633 A.2d 1189 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992), afld, 666 A.2d 238 (Pa. 1995).
156. Allocatur is defined as "[a] word . . . used to denote that a writ or order
was allowed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
157. Baumgart, 666 A_2d at 240. See supra note 153 for the pertinent text of
the applicable statute of limitations.
158. Baumgart, 666 A.2d at 240 (Zappala, J., Opinion in Support of Affir-
mance). The discovery rule tolls the running of the applicable statute of limitations.
Id. (citing Hayward v. Medical Ctr. of Beaver, 608 A.2d 1040, 1043 (Pa. 1992)). The
discovery rule is applicable when an injured party could not have reasonably been
expected to ascertain the existence of an injury. Id. (citing Hayward, 608 A.2d at
1043 (stating that the limitations period does not begin to run until such time as
discovery of the injury is reasonably possible)). Id. However, if the discovery of the
injury was reasonably possible within the limitations period, the discovery rule does
not apply and the statute of limitations is not tolled. Id.
159. Id.
160. 468 A.2d 468 (Pa. 1983) (holding that a statute of limitations begins to
run as soon as the right to institute suit arises and lack of sufficient knowledge due
to failure to exercise due diligence, mistake or misunderstanding do not act to toll
the statute).
161. Baumgart, 666 A.2d at 240.
162. Id. See Ingenito v. AC & S, Inc., 633 A.2d 1172, 1175 (Pa. 1993) (holding
that a worker had not used reasonable diligence in pursuing the cause of his injury,
so the discovery rule did not act to toll the statute of limitations).
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readily ascertainable." Therefore, the court held that summa-
ry judgment was proper as to the survival action because the
decedent and his wife knew of the causative agent that resulted
in the injuries and this knowledge triggered the running of the
statute.'64
The Opinion in Support of Reversal, authored by Justice
Montemuro, noted that the superior court correctly applied the
statute of limitations to the wrongful death claim." 5 The su-
perior court held that because the action was commenced on
March 26, 1987 and the decedent died on March 31, 1985, the
wrongful death claim was proper and should not have been dis-
missed.'" However, the Opinion in Support of Reversal be-
lieved that the superior court incorrectly applied the statute of
limitations to the survival action by refusing to apply the discov-
ery rule. 6 17 Justice Montemuro indicated that neither the dece-
dent nor his wife were under an absolute duty to discover the
existence of the injury or its causative agent." Justice
Montemuro noted that the decedent and his wife merely had to
utilize reasonable diligence6 9 in ascertaining the cause of the
mesothelioma. 7'
The justices supporting reversal agreed with the argument of
the decedent's wife that the issue of whether or not the decedent
used due diligence in determining the causative agent should be
a question for the jury. 7' Therefore, the justices opined that a
grant of summary judgment as to the survival action was inap-
propriate. 7 However, because the supreme court was evenly
divided on the issue, the opinion of the superior court was af-
firmed. 7'
The affirmance of the superior court's opinion establishes that
a court may make a retrospective determination of the reason-
163. Baumgart, 666 A.2d at 241.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 243 (Montemuro, J., Opinion in Support of Reversal).
166. Id. The statute of limitations for a wrongful death cause of action begins
to run at death. Id.
167. Id
168. Baumngart, 666 A_2d at 244. The Opinion in Support of Reversal stated:
"Thus, this case law teaches that a plaintiff is not under an absolute duty to discov-
er the cause of his illness. Instead, he must exercise only the level of diligence that
a reasonable man would employ under the facts and circumstances presented in a
particular case." Id.
169. Id Reasonable diligence is defined as "a reasonable effort to discover the




173. Baumgart, 666 A.2d at 240.
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ableness and diligence of a party in determining the causative
agent of an injury. This determination, prior to Baurngart, was a
factual determination within the realm of the jury. Now courts
may make a determination, as a matter of law, as to the reason-
ableness and diligence of a party in discovering the cause of
injury.
TORTS-PERSONAL INJURY-DAMAGES-STANDARD FOR REMITTI-
TUR-Haines v. Raven Arms, 652 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1995)-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a trial court may only
grant remittitur when the amount of a verdict shocks the con-
science of the court or its sense of justice, and the trial court
must articulate a conclusion and reason for granting remittitur.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Haines v. Raven
Arms 7" that the correct standard for remittiturl7 s is whether
a verdict so shocks the judicial conscience as to suggest that the
jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or
corruption. 76 The supreme court further held that a trial court
must articulate a conclusion and reason for granting remitti-
tur. 1
77
In Haines, Brenda Teagle (the "gun owner") purchased a Ra-
ven Arms P-25 semi-automatic handgun for self-protection.
7
1
The gun owner purchased the gun from Donn's Inc. (the "sell-
er").'79 The gun owner testified that she had no prior knowl-
edge of handguns.8 The gun owner had a neighbor load the
gun.'' Two years later, Diane Teagle (the "gun owner's daugh-
ter") showed the gun to two visitors, Walter Butler (the "shoot-
er") and Tamika Haines ("Tamika").' 8' The shooter removed
the magazine and pulled the trigger, assuming that it was un-
loaded." Tamika was struck in the head by the bullet."
174. 652 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1995) (supplemental opinion).
175. Remittitur is defined as: "The procedural process by which an excessive
verdict of the jury is reduced." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1295 (6th ed. 1990).
176. Haines, 652 A.2d at 1281.
177. Id. at 1281-82.
178. Haines v. Raven Arms, 640 A.2d 367 (Pa. 1994) (holding that the verdict
was excessive and failed to bear a reasonable relationship to the injuries and associ-
ated pain and suffering), affd on reh'g, 652 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1995).





184. Haines, 640 A.2d at 368. The bullet struck Tamika below the left eye. Id.
Tamika underwent several operations in the years subsequent to the shooting. Id.
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The jury found the seller, the gun owner, the gun owner's
daughter and the shooter liable for negligence."s Damages
were awarded in the following amounts: medical expens-
es-125,802.60; loss of earnings-725,000; care and supervi-
sion-$2,500,000; and pain and suffering-$8,000,000.'" Dam-
ages totaled $11,350,802.60.'8 The seller moved for remittitur
as to the damages for pain and suffering after the jury's ver-
dict.' The damages for pain and suffering were reduced from
eight million to five million dollars.'89 The superior court af-
firmed the grant of remittitur and the supreme court granted
allocatur"90 to consider the issue of remittitur.' The su-
preme court affirmed the decision of the trial court.'92
The supreme court, upon reconsideration, directed the trial
court to file a supplemental opinion to delineate the exact stan-
dard that was used to grant remittitur.193 In the supplemental
opinion of the trial court, the trial court indicated that the stan-
dard applied was whether the verdict so shocked the judicial
sense of justice that it suggested jury influence.'9 The su-
preme court, in its supplemental opinion, indicated that such a
statement of shocking the judicial conscience is necessary to
ensure that the correct standard is utilized and the use of this
standard would also facilitate meaningful appellate review."
The supreme court was satisfied that the trial court had both
applied the appropriate standard and stated the rationale for
Tamika was diagnosed with several residual impairments. Id. Tamika has impair-
ments in her vision, cognitive abilities and memory and motor dysfunctions. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 368-69.
187. Id. at 369.
188. Id.
189. Haines, 640 A.2d at 369.
190. Allocatur j- defined as a "word . . . used to denote that a writ or order
was allowed." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
191. Haines, 640 A.2d at 369. The supreme court stated:
[The trial court] granted the remittitur because the verdict was excessive and
failed to bear a reasonable relationship to . . . [Tamika's] pain and suffering.
Damages for pain and suffering are compensatory in nature, may not be arbi-
trary, speculative, or punitive, and must be reasonable. The trial court's justi-
fication for the remittitur does not manifest an abuse of discretion. According-
ly, the judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed.
Id. at 370.
192. Id. at 370.
193. Haines, 652 A.2d at 1281. Justice Flaherty authored the supplemental
supreme court opinion and stated: "Upon reconsideration, the trial court was directed
to file a supplemental opinion explicating the standard upon which remittitur was
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the decision and therefore, the grant of remittitur was af-
firmed.196 Haines serves to clarify the necessary standard for a
grant of remittitur. The use of the required statement eliminates
the potential practice of granting arbitrary remittitur based on
conclusory statements.
TORTS-PRODUCTS LIABILITY-VOLUNTARY ASSUMTION OF THE
RISK--SAFETY MEASURES-Robinson v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co.,
664 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)--The Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that a trial court commits reversible error by in-
structing a jury that an injured party could be found to have
voluntarily assumed a risk if the party failed to utilize available
safety measures.
In Robinson v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 97 the Pennsylvania
Superior Court held that a trial court commits reversible error
by instructing a jury that an injured party could be found to
have voluntarily assumed a risk if the party failed to utilize
available safety measures.'98
In Robinson, John Robinson ("Robinson") was inflating a tire
for a customer at a service station." During the inflation, the
sidewall of the tire blew out and struck Robinson in the face,
resulting in injuries to his face and ear.2" Robinson asserted
that the tire had been defectively manufactured and subsequent-
ly brought an action alleging strict products liability against the
tire retailer and manufacturer. °'
The manufacturer and retailer contended that Robinson, be-
cause of his previous experience with tires, should have known
of the potential risk of an explosion and because of this
knowledge, voluntarily assumed the risk of his resulting inju-
ry.2 2 During jury instructions, the trial court stated that as-
sumption of the risk 3 is a complete defense to strict liabili-
ty.204
196. Id. at 1282.
197. 664 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
198. Robinson, 664 A.2d at 619.
199. Id. at 617.
200. Id.
201. Id. The tire was one of a set of four manufactured by B.F. Goodrich and
sold by Montgomery Ward. Id. The manufacture and sale had been within the
month prior to the accident. Id.
202. Id.
203. Assumption of the risk is defined as: "A defense to action of negligence
which consists of showing that the plaintiff, knowing the dangers and risk involved,
chose to act as he did." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 123 (6th ed. 1990).
204. Robinson, 664 A.2d at 617. The trial court stated: "Assumption of a risk is
1996
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The superior court, in its analysis of the case, noted that un-
der Pennsylvania law an injured party cannot be precluded from
recovering in a products liability action because of negligence on
the part of the injured party.2 5 Therefore, the court noted that
contributory negligence... is not an available defense in a prod-
ucts liability suit.0 7 The court noted that often the application
of the doctrines of assumption of the risk and contributory negli-
gence are intertwined.0 8
In the instant action, the court held that the evidence failed to
demonstrate that Robinson was aware of any specific defect in
the tire.2 The manufacturer and retailer asserted that there
was no existing defect in the tire.210 The manufacturer and the
retailer argued in the alternative that if a defect was found,
then Robinson should have known of the potential danger of the
tire exploding.2 ' Therefore, Robinson, in essence, would be
guilty of contributory negligence and not assumption of the
risk.1 2
The superior court concluded that the trial court confused the
doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of the
risk.213 The court held that this confusion had the effect of in-
fluencing the jury such that a new trial should be granted.21 '
The superior court's opinion clarifies the doctrines of contribu-
tory negligence and assumption of the risk as they apply to
products liability actions. The doctrine of contributory negligence
is not an available defense to a products liability action. There-
fore, injured parties in Pennsylvania may recover in a products
liability action even when contributory negligence is shown.
a bar to the assuming party's claim when the party assuming the risk possessed the
requisite subjective awareness of the dangers and voluntarily assumed the risk by
failing to utilize available safety measures." Id.
205. Id. at 618. See Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 901
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (holding that strict liability of a seller does not depend upon a
showing of negligence on the seller's part and the issue of adequacy of safety warn-
ings is a question for the jury).
206. Contributory negligence is defined as: "Conduct by a plaintiff which is
below the standard to which he is legally required to conform for his own protection
and which is a contributing cause which cooperates with the negligence of the defen-
dant in causing the plaintiffs harm." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1033 (6th ed. 1990).
207. Robinson, 664 A.2d at 618. See McCown v. International Harvester Co.,
342 A.2d 381 (Pa. 1975) (holding that contributory negligence is not a defense
against a Section 402A products liability cause of action).




212. Id. at 618-19.
213. Robinson, 664 A.2d at 619.
214. Id.
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TORTS-DRAM SHOP ACT-INTOXICATING LIQUORS-VISIBLE
INTOXICATION-LICENSEE AND EMPLOYEE LIABILITY-Detwiler v.
Brumbaugh, 656 A.2d 944 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)-The Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court held that the Dram Shop Act contains a
limiting provision whereby licensees are liable only when pa-
trons were visibly intoxicated and held that the Dram Shop Act
is applicable to employees of licensees.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Detwiler v.
Brumbaugh,2 1 held that an employee of a licensee is not insu-
lated from liability when the employee serves alcoholic beverag-
es to a visibly intoxicated customer.1 8
In Detwiler, Ellen Detwiler ("Detwiler") filed suit against
Ronald and Nancy Brumbaugh (the "licensees"), alleging that
she sustained personal injuries in a motor vehicle accident
caused by David Dubbs ("Dubbs"), who had consumed alcoholic
beverages prior to the accident. " The trial court dismissed the
suit and granted the licensees' preliminary objections in the
nature of a demurrer. '18 The trial court held that under the
provisions of the Pennsylvania Dram Shop Act, section 4-497 of
the Pennsylvania Liquor Code ("section 4-497"),19 only a li-
censee can be held liable to a third party and individual employ-
ees are, therefore, insulated from liability.
220
The superior court addressed the issue of whether section 4-
497 insulates employees of licensees from liability when the
employee serves a visibly intoxicated customer. ' The superior
215. 656 A.2d 944 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
216. Detwiler, 656 A.2d at 945.
217. Id. Dubbs died as a result of the motor vehicle accident. Id. Detwiler as-
serted that Dubbs had consumed alcoholic beverages at The Creekside Inn (the
"Inn"), owned by the licensees, immediately prior to the accident. Id. Detwiler's com-
plaint asserted that the licensees were the owners, managers, and/or proprietors of
the Inn. Id. The complaint further asserted that the Inn was licensed to sell and
serve alcohol by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board. Id.
218. Id. A demurrer is defined as: "An allegation of a defendant, which, admit-
ting the matters of fact alleged by complaint . . . to be true, shows that as they are
therein set forth they are insufficient for the plaintiff to proceed ... " BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 432-33 (6th ed. 1990).
219. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-497 (1969 & Supp. 1995).
220. Detwiler, 656 A.2d at 945-46.
221. Id. at 945. The superior court stated: "The trial court's holding that sec-
tion 4-497 insulates individual employees of a licensee is an erroneous interpretation
of the statute." Id. at 946. Section 4-497 states:
No licensee shall be liable to third persons on account of damages inflicted
upon them off of the licensed premises by customers of the licensee unless the
customer who inflicts the damage was sold, furnished or given liquor or malt
or brewed beverages by the said licensee or his agent, servant or employee
1996
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court held that the trial court's interpretation of section 4-497 as
imposing liability only upon licensees was erroneous.222 Section
4-497 was created to act as a barrier providing protection, the
court noted, instead of a provision defining its application to par-
ties.223
The superior court noted that liability has been traditionally
imposed upon the finding of a duty owed to a particular par-
ty.22 4 Section 4-493 of the Pennsylvania Liquor Code, the court
noted, established the duties imposed upon those who served
alcohol to Dubbs.225
Detwiler, the court recognized, averred in her complaint that
because of the actions of the licensees or their employees she
sustained physical injuries.226 The superior court concluded
that Detwiler averred sufficient facts which if proven would
permit recovery on her cause of action. 7 Therefore, the court
held that it was erroneous for the trial court to dismiss the
cause of action based on the licensees' preliminary objections in
the nature of a demurrer. 8 The decision of the trial court was
subsequently vacated.229
The superior court's opinion clarifies that section 4-493 of the
Pennsylvania Liquor Code imposes duties upon licensees and
their employees to refrain from serving intoxicating beverages to
visibly intoxicated individuals. Clarifying this point will add
another avenue for recovery for those injured by individuals who
have been served alcohol while visibly intoxicated.
when the said customer was visibly intoxicated.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-497.
222. Detwiler, 656 A.2d at 946. The superior court stated: "Section 4-497 is
dearly a limiting provision designed to specifically shield licensees from liability to
third parties except in those instances where the patron served was visibly intoxicat-
ed." Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. See Fennell v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 603 A.2d 1064 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct.) (holding that liability may be imposed upon a finding of a duty, breach of
the duty and that harm was proximately caused by the breach of that duty), alloca-
tur denied, 617 A.2d 1274 (Pa. 1992).
225. Detwiler, 656 A.2d at 946. Section 4-493(1) states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful . . . [to fjurnish[] liquor or malt or brewed beverages to
certain persons
(1) For any licensee . . . or any employe, servant or agent of such li-
censee . . . to sell, furnish or give any liquor or malt or brewed bever-
ages, or to permit any liquor or malt or brewed beverages to be sold,
furnished or given, to any person visibly intoxicated ...
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493(1) (Supp. 1995).
226. Detwiler, 656 A.2d at 945.
227. Id. at 947.
228. Id. at 946.
229. Id. at 947.
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IV. Criminal Law
CRIMINAL LAW-RESTITUTION-GOVERNMENTAL AGEN-
cY-DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE-Commonwealth v.
Runion, 662 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1995>-The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that governmental agencies are not "persons" under
the Statutory Construction Act and thus are not "victims" for
purposes of restitution for costs incurred on behalf of a public
assistance recipient.
In Commonwealth v. Runion,"' a welfare recipient was as-
saulted and hospitalized for injuries incurred.3 ' The Depart-
ment of Public Welfare (the "DPW") paid the welfare recipient's
medical costs and subsequently filed a suit for restitution from
the assailant.232 The Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin Coun-
ty found for the DPW and granted restitution.2" The superior
court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the DPW could be
considered a victim for restitution purposes."
The assailant argued to the supreme court that the DPW is
not a victim within the meaning of section 1106 of the Pennsyl-
vania Crimes Code (the "Crimes Code") and is, therefore, not
entitled to restitution. 35 The supreme court found that the res-
titution statute, section 1106 of the Crimes Code, fails to indi-
230. 662 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1995).
231. Runion, 662 A.2d at 618.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. The superior court, however, vacated the restitution order because the
trial court failed to adequately assess the assailant's ability to pay restitution. Id.
235. Id. at 619. Section 1106 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code states in perti-
nent part:
(a) General rule.-Upon conviction for any crime wherein property has been
stolen, converted or otherwise unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially
decreased as a direct result of the crime, or wherein the victim suffered per-
sonal injury directly resulting from the crime, the offender may be sentenced
to make restitution in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor.
(e) Restitution payments and records.-Restitution, when ordered by a judge,
shall be made by the offender to the probation section of the county in which
he was convicted according to the order of the court or, when ordered by a
district justice, shall be made to the district justice. The probation section and
the district justice shall maintain records of the restitution order and its satis-
faction and shall forward to the victim the property or payments made pursu-
ant to the restitution order.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1106 (1990). Section 1106(h) of the Crimes Code further de-
fines a victim as '[a]ny person, except an offender, who suffered injuries to his per-
son or property as a direct result of the crime." Id. § 1106(h).
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cate whether governmental agencies are included within the
definition of "victim.""3 6 Because of the lack of guidance within
the restitution statute, the supreme court relied on the Statuto-
ry Construction Act's definition of "person." 7 In recognizing
that Pennsylvania courts have wrestled with the question of
whether parties that are not direct victims of a crime are enti-
tled to restitution, the supreme court found that none of the
cases addressed the definitions section of the Statutory Con-
struction Act that defines "person."238
A "person," under the Statutory Construction Act, includes "a
corporation, partnership, limited liability company, business
trust, other association, government entity (other than the Com-
monwealth), estate, trust, foundation or natural person.""
Thus, based on the plain and ordinary meaning of person, the
supreme court concluded that governmental agencies of the
Commonwealth are not included within the definition of "per-
son" under the Statutory Construction Act." Despite the su-
preme court's recognition that the primary purpose of the resti-
tution statute is the rehabilitation of an offender, the supreme
court concluded that it is the responsibility of the legislature,
not the courts, to include governmental agencies within the
definition of "victim."
241
Although governmental agencies typically incur significant
expenses on behalf of injured welfare recipients, the supreme
court's decision in Runion precludes governmental agencies from
recovering such costs from offenders. By relying on two distinct-
ly separate statutes, the Runion court reasoned that the preclu-
sion of governmental agencies from the meaning of "persons" in
one statute means that governmental agencies are excluded
from the meaning of "victims" in another statute.
CRIMINAL LAW--CAPITAL SENTENCING-TRIAL COURT DIscRE-
TION-CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES-Commonwealth v. Graham,
661 A.2d 1367 (Pa. 1995)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that a trial court has no discretion to order a death sen-
tence to be consecutive to any other sentences and that a death
sentence is suijuris and stands independent from other sentenc-
ing punishments.
236. Runion, 662 A.2d at 619.
237. Id. (quoting 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1991 (1975)).
238. Id. at 619-21.
239. Id. at 619 (quoting 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1991).
240. Id.
241. Runion, 662 A.2d at 621.
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In Commonwealth v. Graham,242 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court restricted the discretion of a trial court to impose a sen-
tence that is concurrent with or consecutive to other sentenc-
es.' In Graham, the trial court adjudged the defendant, Har-
rison Graham ("Graham"), guilty on seven first degree murder
counts.'" The trial court imposed death sentences on six of the
first degree murder counts consecutive to a life sentence that
was imposed on the seventh first degree murder count.'
On direct appeal of the death sentences, the supreme court
was confronted with the initial problem of the defendant filing a
petition to dismiss the appeal.2" The supreme court decided
that the automatic review of death sentences is separate and
distinct from the appellate rights of defendants.247 The su-
preme court reasoned that the rules of appellate procedure re-
quire appeals in capital cases to begin even without the filing of
a notice of appeal.2"
After reviewing and affirming the trial court's judgments of
death, despite the defendant's filing of a petition to dismiss the
appeal, the supreme court addressed the validity of the trial
court's imposition of the death sentences consecutive to the life
sentence.249 The court recognized that, in Pennsylvania, a sen-
tencing court has discretion to impose sentences that are concur-
rent or consecutive to other sentences.2" However, by relying
primarily on the textual structure of the Sentencing Code, the
supreme court ruled that a sentencing court has no discretion to
impose death sentences consecutive to other sentences.25'
242. 661 A.2d 1367 (Pa. 1995).
243. Graham, 661 A.2d at 1364.
244. Id. at 1369.
245. Id. at 1371.
246. Id. at 1369.
247. Id.
248. Graham, 661 A.2d at 1369.
249. Id. at 1369-71.
250. Id. at 1373.
251. Id. at 1373-74. The supreme court noted that, generally, a sentencing court
has discretion in imposing concurrent or consecutive sentences based on the Sentenc-
ing Code, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721(a) (1990), which provides:
In determining the sentence to be imposed, the court shall, except where a
mandatory minimum sentence is otherwise provided by law, consider and se-
lect one or more of the following alternatives, and may impose them
consecutively or concurrently:
(1) An order of probation.




42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721(a). However, the supreme court ruled that the provisions
1996
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Graham does not change a sentencing court's power to impose
concurrent or consecutive sentences. Graham does, however,
preclude death sentences from the types of sentences that may
be imposed consecutively or concurrently.
CRIMINAL LAW-RESISTING ARREST-UNLAWFUL AR-
REST-PROBABLE CAUSE-AGGRAVATED ASSAULT-SELF DE-
FENSE-Commonwealth v. Biagini, 655 A.2d 492 (Pa. 1995)-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a lack of probable cause
in a police arrest prevents a conviction for the crime of resisting
arrest because the underlying arrest is unlawful, and the unlaw-
fulness of the underlying arrest does not entitle a defendant to
physically resist the officers and does not preclude aggravated
assault convictions. The supreme court further held that the
right to physically resist is only triggered when a defendant uses
self defense against an officer's use of excessive or deadly force.
In Commonwealth v. Biagini,252 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether a conviction for resisting
arrest can be upheld when the underlying arrest is subsequently
found to be unlawful for lack of probable cause.2" During a
routine police patrol, a police officer heard a disturbance and
saw the defendant, Bruce Biagini ("Biagini"), stumble from an
alley.2" The officer approached Biagini and several other indi-
viduals to inquire about the disturbance. 55 Biagini returned to
his home, refused to answer any more questions posed by the
officer, and ordered the officer to leave his propertyY6 The offi-
cer then informed Biagini that he was being arrested for public
intoxication and disorderly conduct."7 Biagini refused, a scuffle
ensued, the officer was injured, and Biagini was subsequently
arrested with the help of additional officers. 58 The trial court
convicted Biagini of public intoxication, disorderly conduct, ag-
gravated assault, resisting arrest, and other charges.259
The superior court overruled the trial court and held that the
of § 9721(a) are inapplicable to a death sentence because the death penalty provi-
sions are contained in Subchapter B of the Sentencing Code, while § 9721(a) is con-
tained in Subchapter C. Graham, 661 A.2d at 1373.
252. 655 A.2d 492 (Pa. 1995).
253. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 493.




258. Biagini, 655 A-2d at 494.
259. Id. Biagini was also convicted of possession of prohibited weapons and
marijuana. Id.
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officer did not have probable cause to arrest Biagini for either
public intoxication or disorderly conduct.26 Although the supe-
rior court held that the underlying arrests were unlawful, the
court upheld the conviction for resisting arrest, concluding that
Biagini possessed no right to resist an officer who was perform-
ing his duties.26'
In a separate incident, which was subsequently consolidated
with the Biagini incident for review by the supreme court, a
police officer approached an area in which a narcotics sale was
to take place." 2 When the officer approached an area where
the defendant, Barry W., and another man were standing, the
two men fled.26 The officer ran after the men, a struggle en-
sued, the officer was injured, and Barry W. was subsequently
arrested and convicted of aggravated assault, resisting arrest,
and other charges.2 The superior court held that the officer
lacked probable cause for the arrest, reversed Barry W.'s con-
viction for resisting arrest, and affirmed Barry W.'s aggravated
assault conviction.265
Because the superior court rendered two decisions that were
inconsistent, Biagini's and Barry W.'s appeals were consolidated
for review by the supreme court. 26  The essence of the
defendants' argument was that a conviction for resisting arrest
cannot be upheld when the underlying arrest is unlawful.2 7
The supreme court, focusing on the language of the statute,
found that the lawfulness of the underlying arrest is an essen-
tial element of the crime of resisting arrest.2' Accepting the
superior court's opinions in both cases that each arrest lacked
probable cause, the supreme court reversed Biagini's conviction
for resisting arrest and affirmed the reversal of Barry W.'s re-
260. Id. at 493, 495 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5503, 5505 (1990)). See Com-
monwealth v. Biagini, 627 A.2d 199 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), afl'd in part, rev'd in
part, 655 A.2d 492 (Pa. 1995).
261. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 495.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 495-96. Barry W. was also convicted of simple assault and adjudi-
cated delinquent. Id. at 496.
265. Id. at 496.
266. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 493.
267. Id. at 496.
268. Id. at 497 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104 (1990)). A person commits
the crime of resisting arrest if, "with the intent of preventing a public servant from
effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any other duty, the person creates a sub-
stantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else, or employs means
justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance." 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5104.
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sisting arrest conviction." 9
However, the supreme court ruled that the defendants had no
right to physically resist the officers despite the unlawfulness of
their arrests.27 The supreme court reasoned that not only is
physical resistance to an officer specifically precluded by law,
but also physical resistance fosters a disorderly resolution of
problems. 7' Because a lawful arrest is not an element of the
crime of aggravated assault, the supreme court affirmed both
defendants' convictions for aggravated assault.272
Finally, the supreme court ruled that Pennsylvania does not
recognize a right to resist an arrest.273 The only situation in
which physical resistance may be justified is when a defendant
uses self defense against an officer's use of excessive or deadly
force.274 Therefore, based on Biagini, an officer may engage in
a clearly unlawful and unpredicated arrest and as long as the
officer does not use excessive or deadly force, the arrestee is not
entitled to physically resist. The arrestee may then be charged
with aggravated assault for resisting that which was unlawfully
inflicted.
CRIMINAL LAW-RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY--STOLEN RE-
QUIREMENT-Commonwealth v. Stafford, 652 A.2d 297 (Pa.
1995)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that there is no
requirement that goods be stolen in order for a defendant to be
convicted of the crime of receiving stolen property.
In Commonwealth v. Stafford,27' the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was confronted with the issue of whether property must
actually be stolen in order for a defendant to be convicted of the
crime of receiving stolen property.276 In Stafford, a jury con-
victed the defendant of the crime and the superior court re-
versed and contended that the jury must be informed that the
Commonwealth must prove that the property was actually sto-
269. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 497.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 497-98 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(b)(1)(i) (1990)). Section
505(b)(1)(i) provides: "The use of force is not justifiable to resist an arrest which the
actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful." 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(b)(1)(i).
272. Biagini, 655 A.2d at 498 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2702(a)(3),
505(b)(1)(i) (1990)).
273. Id. at 499.
274. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. French, 611 A.2d 175 (Pa. 1992)).
275. 652 A.2d 297 (Pa. 1995).
276. Stafford, 652 A.2d at 297.
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len.
277
The supreme court disagreed with the superior court's conclu-
sion."8 The supreme court acknowledged that, before June 6,
1973, the statute proscribing receiving stolen property required
that goods were actually stolen."9 However, the supreme court
recognized that the "stolen" requirement was eliminated in the
present statute. 20 The statute merely provides that: "A person
is guilty of theft if he intentionally receives, retains, or disposes
of movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen,
or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the property
is received, retained, or disposed with intent to restore it to the
owner.""' Therefore, the supreme court decided that property
need not actually be stolen for a defendant to be convicted of the
crime of receiving stolen property.8 2
Stafford expands the permissible grounds for a charge and
conviction of receiving stolen property. When a person possesses
property that the person believes to have been stolen, such per-
son may be convicted of receiving stolen property despite the
subsequent discovery that the property was not stolen.
CRIMINAL LAW-AGGRAVATED ASSAULT-UNDERCOVER POLICE
OFFICERS-Commonwealth v. Flemings, 652 A.2d 1282 (Pa.
1995)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that knowledge of
a victim's identity as a police officer is not an element of aggra-
vated assault.
Commonwealth v. Flemings' involved two undercover po-
lice officers who were posing as drug purchasers.2 While at-
tempting to sell the officers illegal drugs, the defendant noticed
a pistol in the possession of one of the undercover officers.2"
The defendant grabbed the pistol, pointed it at the officers, then
ran away.2" The defendant was subsequently arrested and




279. Id. at 298.
280. Id.
281. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3925 (1990).
282. Stafford, 652 A.2d at 298.
283. 652 A.2d 1282 (Pa. 1995).
284. Flemings, 652 A.2d at 1283.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1282. The defendant was also charged with conspiracy, theft, pos-
session of a firearm without a license, and reckless endangerment. Id.
1996
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The jury found the defendant guilty on each count and the
superior court reversed because it concluded that the defendant's
knowledge of the victims' identities as police officers is a materi-
al element of aggravated assault under section 2702(a)(3) of the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code. 88
In deciding that a defendant's knowledge of a victim's identity
as a police officer is not an element of the crime of aggravated
assault, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on a United
States Supreme Court decision that reached the same conclusion
regarding a similar federal statute.289 The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court further reasoned that to make the crime of aggra-
vated assault contingent on a defendant's knowledge of the
victim's identity would divest undercover officers of their protec-
tion.29 The supreme court concluded that wrongdoers take
their victims as found. 1 The court held that a defendant's
knowledge of an officer's identity is relevant only in those rare
instances when an officer fails to reveal his official status and
engages in conduct that could reasonably be viewed as an un-
lawful use of force.292
Flemings enlarges the scope of aggravated assault convictions.
When charged with aggravated assault, a defendant can only
use the lack of knowledge of a police officer's identity as a de-
fense when the officer engages in an unlawful use of force.
CRIMINAL LAW-DSTRICT ATTORNEY PROSECUTORIAL POW-
ER-POLICE AUTHORITY-NONPROSECUTION AGREE-
MENT-Commonwealth v. Stipetich, 652 A.2d 1294 (Pa.
1995)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a county dis-
trict attorney's power to prosecute is not restricted by a
nonprosecution agreement between police and drug offenders,
and police officers do not have the authority to dictate whether a
county district attorney can file charges.
In Commonwealth v. Stipetich,293 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court addressed the validity of a nonprosecution agreement
288. Id. at 1283. The crime of aggravated assault is proscribed in 18 PA. CONS.
STAT § 2702(a)(3) (1990), which provides: "A person is guilty of aggravated assault if
he . . . attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a
police officer . . . in the performance of duty." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(3).
289. Flemings, 652 A.2d at 1284. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671
(1975) (holding that knowledge of a victim's identity as a federal officer is not an
element of the crime of assault of a federal officer).
290. Flemings, 652 A.2d at 1285.
291. Id. (citing Feola, 420 U.S. at 684-85).
292. Id.
293. 652 A.2d 1294 (Pa. 1995).
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between police officers and individuals possessing drug sub-
stances.2" In Stipetich, police officers, pursuant to a warranted
search, discovered drug substances in the defendants' home.",'
The police agreed not to file criminal charges against the defen-
dants if the defendants revealed the source of the illegal
drugs.29 The defendants satisfied their part of the agreement
by providing the police with answers to all questions posed.9 7
However, the county district attorney still filed charges against
the defendants for drug possession. 98
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and cited the
nonprosecution agreement with the police.299 The court of com-
mon pleas granted the motion to dismiss, and the superior court
affirmed.3 "° The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed.3'
The supreme court began its analysis by acknowledging the
well-established principle that district attorneys possess wide
discretion in deciding whether to file charges."2 While recog-
nizing that police officers have discretion in deciding whether an
arrest, citation, or a warrant is necessary, the supreme court
held that police have no power to enter into agreements that re-
strict a district attorney's power to prosecute.0 3 The supreme
court further found that to provide police with the authority to
restrict the district attorney in prosecuting would clearly in-
fringe on the powers granted to the district attorney by the con-
stitution, legislature, and case law."'
The supreme court concluded that the nonprosecution agree-
ment was invalid because the district attorney did not consent to
the agreement.3 5 The supreme court further concluded that
police officers do not have the power to bind a district attorney
to not file criminal charges.3"
Stipetich effectively eliminates the validity of nonprosecution
agreements between police officers and individuals subject to
possible investigation. Without the district attorney's consent, an
alleged offender may comply with all the provisions in a
294. Stipetich, 652 A_2d at 1294.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1295.
298. Id.
299. Stipetich, 652 A.2d at 1295.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 246 A-2d 430 (Pa. 1968)).
303. Id.





nonprosecution agreement and still be subject to subsequent
prosecution.
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY--JOINT TRIAL-ACQUITTAL OF CO-
CONSPIRATORS-Commonwealth v. Campbell, 651 A.2d 1096 (Pa.
1994)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a defendant
may be convicted of the crime of conspiracy even though the sole
alleged co-conspirator was acquitted of conspiracy during a joint
trial with the defendant.
In Commonwealth v. Campbell, 7 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court was confronted with an issue of first impression
when a jury returned inconsistent verdicts in a joint trial
against two alleged co-conspirators."' In Campbell, the defen-
dant and an alleged co-conspirator were charged with criminal
conspiracy involving the sale of controlled substances.3" In the
joint trial of the two alleged co-conspirators, the jury questioned
the court whether, "[iun the event the jury has reasonable doubt
as to the identity of one co-conspirator, may the other co-conspir-
ator be guilty of conspiracy?"310 The trial court responded that
the jury may find both, none, or only one of the defendants
guilty. " The jury then found the defendant guilty of conspir-
acy and acquitted the alleged co-conspirator of all charges.312
On appeal, the defendant asserted that a joint trial involving
conspiracy charges requires a jury to return consistent ver-
dicts." The supreme court discussed two cases in which differ-
ent verdicts were reached in separate trials of two alleged co-
conspirators and determined that the rationale of the two cases
was applicable to different verdicts in a joint trial of co-conspira-
tors. " The court thereafter concluded that a jury need not re-
turn consistent verdicts. in a joint trial against co-conspira-
307. 651 A.2d 1096 (Pa. 1994).
308. Campbell, 651 A.2d at 1097.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1098.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Campbell, 651 A.2d at 1098.
314. Id. at 1098-99. The first case that the supreme court discussed was Com-
monwealth v. Byrd, 417 A.2d 173 (Pa. 1980), in which the court concluded that a
convicted conspirator is not entitled to a reversal of conviction despite the subse-
quent acquittal of a sole alleged co-conspirator in a separate trial. Id. at 1098 (citing
Byrd). The second case which the supreme court discussed was Commonwealth v.
Phillips, 601 A.2d 816 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), in which the court held that a defen-
dant is not entitled to an acquittal of conspiracy charges despite the previous ac-
quittal of a sole alleged co-conspirator. Id at 1099 (citing Phillips).
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tors.3 '
The court further supported its conclusion by discussing deci-
sions by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court.3"6 In Commonwealth v. Brown,"1 7 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that an accomplice could be found
guilty of a crime despite the acquittal of an alleged principal."8
In Commonwealth v. Carter," the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court discussed the concept of consistency in verdicts and stated
that the long-standing rule in Pennsylvania has been that crimi-
nal cases do not require consistency in verdicts.32 In Dunn v.
United States, 22 the United States Supreme Court held that a
defendant who is convicted on one criminal count is not entitled
to challenge the conviction despite the inconsistency of the jury's
verdict on another count.322  And, in United States v.
Powell,23 the United States Supreme Court held that a con-
viction of federal felonies could not be attacked despite the jury's
acquittal of the defendant on the predicate felonies."z The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged that Dunn and
Powell involved inconsistent verdicts against a single defendant
who was charged with several counts.3' However, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court extended the Dunn and Powell rationales
to inconsistent verdicts against defendants in a joint trial be-
cause the jury, in both cases, was confronted with similar infor-
mation at the same trial and delivered inconsistent verdicts. 326
In conclusion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
trial judge did not commit an error when the jury was provided
with the instruction that it could convict one conspirator while
acquitting the other conspirator in a joint trial.327
By analyzing and extending the rationales of several Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court cases,
the Campbell court eliminated any previous requirement for con-
sistent verdicts in joint trials of co-conspirators. A defendant
may be convicted of conspiracy despite the acquittal of a sole
315. Id. at 1098.
316. Id. at 1099-1101.
317. 375 A2d 331 (Pa. 1975).
318. Brown, 375 A.2d at 333-36.
319. 282 A.2d 375 (Pa. 1971).
320. Carter, 282 A.2d at 376-77.
321. 284 U.S. 390 (1932).
322. Dunn, 284 U.S. at 393.
323. 469 U.S. 57 (1984).
324. Powell, 469 U.S. at 63-69.
325. Campbell, 651 A-2d at 1100.




alleged co-conspirator in a joint trial of the two alleged conspira-
tors.
CRIMINAL LAW-ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE-INCULPATORY
STATEMENT-ANTICIPATED CHARGES-Commonwealth v. Mrozek,
657 A.2d 997 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)-The Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that a defendant's inculpatory statement to an
attorney's secretary is within the scope of the attorney-client
privilege despite the statement being made before charges were
filed and before the actual establishment of a formal attorney-
client relationship.
In Commonwealth v. Mrozek,3"' the Pennsylvania Superior
Court addressed the scope of the attorney-client privilege when
a communication is made to someone other than an attorney
and when a formal attorney-client relationship has not yet been
established.329 In Mrozek, the defendant phoned an attorney
who had previously represented the defendant on other charg-
es. 30 The attorney's secretary repeatedly informed the defen-
dant that the attorney was not available to talk to the defen-
dant.33 ' The defendant then responded by stating: "Honey, I
don't think you understand. I've just committed a homicide. I
have to talk with [the attorney]."33 2 The attorney then an-
swered the phone and subsequently accompanied the defendant
during questioning by the district attorney.333
The defendant was formally charged with homicide, and the
district attorney subpoenaed the attorney's secretary to testify
concerning the defendant's inculpatory statement.3  The de-
fendant filed a motion to suppress the inculpatory statement,
citing the attorney-client privilege.335 The trial court ruled in
favor of the district attorney, and the defendant was subsequent-
ly convicted of murder in the first degree.3 '
The superior court ruled that the trial court erred when it did
not suppress the secretary's testimony concerning the
defendant's inculpatory statement.3 7 The court held that com-
munications to an attorney's secretary are covered by the attor-
328. 657 A.2d 997 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
329. Mrozek, 657 A.2d at 998, 999.




334. Mrozek, 657 A.2d at 998.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 997.
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ney-client privilege because a secretary is an attorney's subordi-
nate."8 The court further found that initial communications
between an attorney and a potential client are privileged.339
Thus, the court concluded that the attorney-client privilege
extends not only to communications with an attorney but also to
communications with an attorney's employees and agents.3"
The court further concluded that the attorney-client privilege
encompasses initial communications made for the purpose of
retaining the services of counsel.3"
Mrozek expands the protection afforded to a defendant by
precluding statements made prior to the creation of an attorney-
client relationship and statements made with an attorney's em-
ployees and agents from being used against the defendant at
trial.
CRIMINAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT-UNREASONABLE SEARCH-
ES AND SEIZURES-PARDON AND PAROLE-CONSENT
FORM-Commonwealth v. Walter, 655 A.2d 554 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995)-The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a consent
form that is signed as a condition of obtaining parole and that
authorizes the warrantless search of a parolee's person and
property is violative of the parolee's Fourth Amendment rights.
In Commonwealth v. Walter,3 4' a parolee signed a standard
parole form that expressly gave written consent to the warrant-
less search of his person and property."4' Based on a robbery
lead, a warrantless search was conducted on the parolee's prop-
erty that subsequently led to a warranted search and arrest of
the parolee.3 " The parolee filed a motion to suppress the evi-
dence seized at his property, and the trial court granted the mo-
tion." On appeal from the order granting the motion to sup-
press, the superior court began its analysis with the assertion
338. Id. at 998, 999.
339. Mrozek, 657 A.2d at 999.
340. Id. at 1000.
341. Id.
342. 655 A.2d 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
343. Walter, 655 A.2d at 556. The parole form stated:
I expressly consent to the search of my person, property and residence, with-
out a warrant by agents of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole.
Any items, in the possession of which constitutes a violation of parole/reparole
shall be subject to seizure, and may be used as evidence in the parole revoca-
tion process.
Id.




that parolees possess a Fourth Amendment right against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures." The superior court cemented
its proposition by citing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Commonwealth v. Pickron.47 In Pickron, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that "the Fourth Amendment prohib-
its the warrantless search of probationers or parolee's residences
based upon reasonable suspicion without the consent of the own-
er or without a statutory or regulatory framework governing the
search."
3
The superior court held that the consent form in Walter was
inconsistent with the Pickron case. 49 First, the superior court
found that the parolee had no real choice in signing the consent
form because the parolee either had to sign the consent form or
he would not be entitled to parole.5 Second, the superior
court found that the consent form contained no safeguards of the
parolee's Fourth Amendment rights because the form provided
no criteria to establish when a warrantless search could be con-
ducted."'
Because the consent form gave the parolee no rights and pro-
vided him with no Fourth Amendment protection, the superior
court concluded that the consent form was inconsistent with the
parolee's constitutional rights. 2
By inviting the broad constitutional protections of the Fourth
Amendment, the Walter court invalidated consent forms that
authorize a warrantless search of a parolee's person and proper-
ty. For a consent form to be valid under Walter, the consent
form must afford the parolee with an opportunity to sign or
refuse to sign, and the consent form must provide adequate
Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless searches.
CRIMINAL LAW-AGGRAVATED ASSAULT-INTENT-Common-
wealth v. Lopez, 654 A.2d 1150 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)-The
Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a person who fires gun
shots into an empty residence can be convicted of aggravated
assault if the person possesses the intent to cause physical inju-
ry, even though actual injury is impossible.
346. Id. at 555-56.
347. Id. at 556 (citing Commonwealth v. Pickron, 634 A.2d 1093 (Pa. 1993)).
348. Pickron, 634 A.2d at 1098.
349. Walter, 655 A.2d at 556-57.
350. Id. at 556.
351. Id. at 557.
352. Id.
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In Commonwealth v. Lopez," 3 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court was confronted with the issue of whether an aggravated
assault charge35 can withstand a finding that actual injury to
the intended victim was impossible. 5' In Lopez, the defendant
told his ex-girlfriend that he would kill her if he possessed a
weapon.' After damaging his ex-girlfriend's son's car, the de-
fendant stated that "the war will continue."57 The defendant
then drove away while his ex-girlfriend stood outside of her
home." 8 After a short time, the defendant returned to his ex-
girlfriend's home and shot eight bullets at the front door. 59
Unknown to the defendant, his ex-girlfriend went to hide in a
neighbor's home and was not inside her home when the defen-
dant shot at the front door.3"
At a preliminary hearing, a municipal court judge ruled that a
prima facie case of aggravated assault had been established
against the defendant.6 ' The court of common pleas found that
the aggravated assault charge could not stand because of the
absence of a showing that the defendant intended to cause phys-
ical injury because his intended victim was not inside her resi-
dence. 62 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found
that a misunderstanding of a situation, which renders the carry-
ing out of an attempted crime impossible, is not a defense to the
attempted crime.3" The court held that the Commonwealth
bears the burden of proving that the defendant intended to
cause physical injury when the defendant's conduct did not
cause any physical injury.'
Because the defendant threatened his ex-girlfriend, told her
he would continue their "war," and returned a short time later
to fire bullets into her home, the superior court ruled that a
reasonable jury could find that the defendant intended to cause
physical injury." In reversing and remanding the case for tri-
al, the superior court concluded that a defendant's state of mind,
not the presence or absence of an intended victim, is the critical
353. 654 k2d 1150 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
354. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702 (Supp. 1995).





360. Lopez, 654 A.2d at 1152.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 1153.
363. Id. at 1154 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 901(b) (1990)).
364. Id.
365. Lopez, 654 A.2d at 1155.
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factor in determining whether an aggravated assault was com-
mitted.66
Lopez emphasized that the crime of aggravated assault focus-
es on the defendant's intent rather than the defendant's ability
to inflict physical injury. Thus, neither physical injury nor the




AND THIRD PARTIES-SIGNIFICANT FACTOR STANDARD-Rowles v.
Rowles, 668 A.2d 126 (Pa. 1995)-The Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania held that the standard to be applied in custody disputes
between parents and third parties is the "significant factor"
standard, which abandons the previous presumption of parental
custody standard.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held in Rowles v.
Rowles367 that the standard to be applied in custody disputes
between parents and third parties is the "significant factor"
standard and that parents no longer have a prima facie right to
custody as against third parties.3"
In Rowles, Michelle (the "mother") and David (the "father")
(collectively the "parents") and their two children resided in the
home of Blair and Julia Rowles (the "grandparents")." 9 The
parents began to experience marital difficulties and subsequent-
ly moved out of the home of the grandparents.370 The grand-
parents were given physical custody of the two children. 7'
One and one-half years later, the parents initiated divorce
proceedings.372 The parents executed an agreement that be-
stowed guardianship rights on the grandparents and also grant-
ed the grandparents physical custody of the children.373
366. Id.
367. 668 A.2d 126 (Pa. 1995).
368. Rowles, 668 A.2d at 128.
369. Id. The children were Edward, age 7, and Michelle, age 5, at the time of
this proceeding. Id.
370. Id. The marital discord developed two months after the birth of Michelle.
Id.
371. Id.
372. Id. Divorce proceedings were initiated in February of 1992. Id.
373. Rowles, 668 A.2d at 127. In May of 1992, the agreement became 'part of
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Six months after the guardianship arrangements were final-
ized, the mother petitioned the trial court to obtain physical
custody of the two children.374 The trial court determined that
physical custody should remain with the grandparents.37 The
trial court's decision was affirmed by the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania. 7 '
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur377 to
review the legal standard appropriate for disputes involving
custody between parents and third parties.37 The court also
addressed the application of this standard to the instant
case.
379
The first issue addressed by the court was whether the stan-
dard applied by the trial court was the appropriate standard for
custody disputes between parents and third parties.3 8 The tri-
al court applied the standard announced in Ellerbe v. Hooks.38'
In Ellerbe, the supreme court was faced with a custody dis-
pute between a parent and a third party.32 The supreme court
held that there is a prima facie presumption that custody should
be awarded to parents, except in situations where there is a
clear indication that custody should be awarded to a third
party.3" In Ellerbe, Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice
the divorce decree between the parents. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. See Rowles v. Rowles, 653 A.2d 1309 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding
that the decision of the trial court concerning the retention of physical custody by
the grandparents of the two children should be affirmed), rev'd, 668 A.2d 126 (Pa.
1995).
377. Allocatur is defined as "[a] word . .. used to denote that a writ or order
was allowed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
378. Rowles, 668 A.2d at 127.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. 416 A.2d 512 (Pa. 1980) (holding that parents have a prima facie right to
custody of their children as against third parties, however, this is not a conclusive
presumption).
382. Ellerbe, 416 A.2d at 513.
383. Id. at 513-14. The court stated:
[P]arents have a "prima facie right to custody," which "may be forfeited if
convincing reasons appear that the best interests of the child will be served
by awarding custody to someone else." . . . [Tihe Superior Court, through
Judge Spaeth, articulated the following approach:
"When the judge is hearing a dispute between the parents, or a parent,
and a third party .... [t]he question still is, what is in the child's best
interest?" However, the parties do not start out even; the parents have
a."prima facie right to custody," which will be forfeited only if "convinc-
ing reasons" appear that the child's best interest will be served by an
award to the third party. Thus, even before the proceedings start, the
evidentiary scale is tipped, and tipped hard, to the parents' side.
We agree that this approach is appropriate. Clearly these principles do
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Nix, concurred in the opinion of the court, but questioned the
prima facie presumption that parents have a right to custody
over third parties.3"
In Rowles, the supreme court recognized the wisdom of the
concurring opinion in Ellerbe and therefore abandoned the pre-
sumption of parental custody and replaced it with a "significant
factor" standard."' This standard includes the physical, men-
tal and emotional factors associated with the well-being of a
child.8 '
The court then addressed the facts of Rowles in relationship to
the new "significant factor" standard. 7 The court recognized
not preclude an award of custody to the non-parent. Rather they simply in-
struct the hearing judge that the non-parent bears the burden of production
and the burden of persuasion and that the non-parent's burden is heavy.
Thus where circumstances do not clearly indicate the appropriateness
of awarding custody to a non-parent, we believe the less intrusive and hence
the proper course is to award custody to the parent or parents.
Id.
384. Id. at 516 (Flaherty, J., concurring). Justice Flaherty's opinion addressed
the hazards associated with the presumption. Id. Justice Flaherty stated:
In Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson [citation omitted] where we over-
ruled the "tender years" presumption that custody should be awarded to moth-
ers rather than fathers, we stated: "Courts should be wary of deciding matters
as sensitive as questions of custody by the invocation of "presumptions." In-
stead, we believe that our courts should inquire into the circumstances and
relationships of all the parties involved and reach a determination based solely
upon the facts of the case before the Court." The same reasoning should apply
where the custody dispute is between parents and third parties .... [T]he
underlying tenor of the "presumption" reflects an archaic concept that children
are proprietary assets of parents. Serious question may be posed with respect
to the soundness of the apriorism that mere biological relationship assures so-
licitude, care, devotion, and love for one's offspring .... [Wihere a third
party better fulfills these needs, or where other circumstances indicate third
party custody to be preferable, the courts, when exercising judgment as to a
child's welfare, should not be restrained solely by a presumption.
[The majority's] approach should be replaced with a rule which would simplify
and clarify application of the best interest standard. By clearly eliminating the
presumption per se, and mandating that custody be determined by a prepon-
derance of evidence, weighing parenthood as a strong factor for consideration,
custody proceedings would be disentangled from the burden of applying a
presumption that merely beclouds the ultimate concern in these cases: the de-
termination of what affiliation will best serve the child's interests, including
physical, emotional, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being.
Id. at 516-17.
385. Rowles, 668 A.2d at 128. The court indicated that there should be no sin-
gle factor that is afforded greater weight. Id. Courts must consider all relevant facts,
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that the trial court examined the admirable qualities of the
grandparents, but neglected to equally examine the qualities of
the mother and her relationship to the children.3" The mother,
as noted by the supreme court, had daily contact with her chil-
dren and was also a stabilizing factor for the children.38 The
supreme court concluded that the trial court and the superior
court attached a disproportionate amount of weight to the
grandparents' claim of stability and ignored the mother's partici-
pation in the lives of the children.390
In conclusion, the supreme court indicated that as to the facts
of this case, the parental relationship certainly outweighed the
other factors. 91 In so concluding, the supreme court reversed
the decision of the superior court.392
The supreme court established a new "significant factor" stan-
dard for the determination of custody as between parents and
third parties. The court delineated several factors that should be
treated equally in making a determination of custody. However,
the court focused on the maternal relationship with children and
seemingly ignored those positive factors of equal weight associat-
ed with grandparents. Therefore, in essence, the supreme court
has also attributed a disproportionate amount of weight to cer-
tain factors.
DoMESTIc RELATIONS-EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT-Curtis v. Kline,
666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that a statute providing for postsecondary educational child
support violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Pennsylvania's Constitution.
In March of 1993, Philip Kline ("Kline") filed a petition to
terminate his support obligation to his daughter, Amber, and his
son, Jason, both college students.393 In support of the petition,
Kline contested the constitutionality of the postsecondary educa-
tional support provisions of Act 62 of 1993 (the "Act").394 The
388. Id. The trial court indicated that the grandparents were physically and
mentally fit and provided the necessary love, affection and stability needed by the
children. Id.
389. Id.
390. Rowles, 668 A.2d at 130.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 267 (Pa. 1995).
394. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 267. The Act provides that: "[A) court may order ei-
ther or both parents who are separated, divorced, unmarried or otherwise subject to
an existing support obligation to provide equitably for educational costs of their child
whether an application for this support is made before or after the child has
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trial court granted the petition to terminate support, and the
supreme court affirmed on the grounds that the Act violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and article I,
section 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.95
Preliminarily, the court explained that the legislature may
make classifications among citizens that are not arbitrary, and
are reasonably related to the legislation's purpose. 96 The court
noted that a court's review of a classification must first deter-
mine that the distinction is genuine and not artificial. 97 In ad-
dition, the court reasoned that a court must determine the rela-
tive importance of the classification and apply a differing stan-
dard of review depending upon that importance. 98 Specifically,
the court opined, a classification involving a suspect class or a
fundamental right must undergo strict scrutiny and serve a com-
pelling governmental purpose, while classifications dealing with
an "important" right or "sensitive" classification are subjected to
a heightened scrutiny and must serve an "important" govern-
mental purpose, and finally, all other kinds of classifications are
upheld if they are rationally related to a legitimate governmen-
tal purpose. 99
The court then determined that the classification did not in-
volve any suspect or sensitive classifications or fundamental or
important rights, and was therefore subject to a rational basis
test.4" The rational basis test proceeds in two parts: 1) is there
a legitimate state interest or public value, and if so, 2) is the
classification rationally related to that purpose? 1
reached 18 years of age." 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4327(a) (Supp. 1995). The Act was
promulgated in response to the court's decision in Blue v. Blue, 616 A.2d 628 (Pa.
1992) (holding that there is no duty to provide college educational support).
395. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 270. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides: "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The court noted that "we
would apply the same analysis and reach the same result under our state constitu-
tion," even though Kline did not raise a state constitutional claim. Id. at 267 n.1.
Article I, section 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: "[N]either the Com-
monwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoy-
ment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any
civil right." PA. CONST. art I, § 26.
396. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 268 (citing Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co.,
515 A.2d 1358 (Pa. 1986)).
397. Id. (citing Equitable Credit and Discount Co. v. Geier, 21 A.2d 53 (Pa.
1941)).
398. Id.
399. Id. (citing Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 516 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1986)).
400. Id. at 268-69.
401. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 269 (citing Plowman v. Commonwealth, 635 A.2d 124
(Pa. 1993)).
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The court determined that the legislation distinguished be-
tween children of intact families and children of divorced, sepa-
rated, or unmarried families. 2 Specifically, the court held that
the classification was arbitrary because there was no rational
basis for providing only children of non-intact families with a
means of compelling parental support for college.4 3 The court
distinguished a contrary decision by the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court by stating that the New Hampshire court based its
decision on its own state constitution and a classification that
focussed not on children, but on parents.4"'
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Montemuro criticized the
court for finding that children of divorced parents are on equal
footing with children of intact families in reference to financing
college education, and additionally for focusing the equal protec-
tion analysis on the children, rather than on the parents."5
Specifically, the dissent argued that many divorced parents are
"determined" to avoid postsecondary educational support, even
when the non-custodial parent has sufficient resources to do
so.' In addition, the dissent noted that most children of intact
families continue to receive post-majority support, further legiti-
mizing the classification.4"7
The dissent also argued that because the classification is
based on unequal treatment of children, the Mine's standing to
bring the claim was questionable."8 In addition, the dissent
noted that the majority distinguished the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court's decision that similar legislation did not violate
equal protection by stating that the Pennsylvania statute fo-
cuses not on parents, but on children.' The dissent pointed
out that the legislative history of both states' legislation was the
same, there was no statutory language indicating a focus on
children, and that all child support legislation distinguishes be-
tween children of intact families and children of divorced or sep-
arated families. 10
The court's analysis was flawed because it analyzed the classi-
402. Id.
403. Id. at 270.
404. Id. (citing LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350 (N.H. 1993)).
405. Id. at 271 (Montemuro, J., dissenting).
406. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 272 (citing Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201 (Wash.
1978) and L. WEIrzMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 278 (1985)).
407. Id. at 273 (Montemuro, J., dissenting) (citing R. Washburn, Post-Majority
Support: Oh Dad, Poor Dad, 44 TEMPLE L.Q. 319, 329 n.55 (1971)).
408. Id. at 273 n.5.
409. Id. at 270.
410. Id. at 272 n.3.
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fication of children, rather than the classification of parents. The
court failed to protect its most vulnerable citizens in a time
when many forms of financial aid are at risk, making post-sec-
ondary education impossible for many.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-DIVORCE-EQUITABLE DISTRIBU-
TION-Butler v. Butler, 663 A.2d 148 (Pa. 1995)-The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that the goodwill and/or going con-
cern value of a spouse's business is only one factor to consider in
valuing the business for equitable distribution purposes.
In December of 1984, Carol and Leon Butler separated.4"
They were divorced in 1988 and a master was appointed to re-
solve outstanding economic issues." The parties disputed the
value of Mr. Butler's business interest for purposes of equitable
distribution of the marital property."3
Mr. Butler had a partnership interest in an accounting firm
where his employment was governed by the terms of a share-
holder agreement.4 14 The agreement provided for a mandatory
sale of Mr. Butler's shares to the corporation at a price of $10
per share in the event of voluntary termination, loss of license,
or permanent disability."5 Further, the agreement provided
that when a shareholder dies, his or her shares would be pur-
chased from the personal representative for $100,000, to be paid
for with a term life insurance policy on the life of the part-ner.416
Mr. Butler argued that his interest in the business was fixed
by the terms of the shareholder agreement at $2,450.41? Mrs.
Butler, however, presented expert testimony that the going con-
cern and/or goodwill value of the partnership was close to
$500,000.48 The expert disagreed with Mr. Butler's assessment
and stated that the shareholder's agreement indicated a value of
$300,000, the value of the term life insurance on the three part-
ners." 9 The master then averaged what he saw as the value
assigned by the shareholder agreement with the value assigned
by Mrs. Butler's expert. 20
411. Butler v. Butler, 663 A.2d 148, 150 (Pa. 1995).
412. Butler, 663 A.2d at 150.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id. The sale would total $2,450. Id.
416. Id.
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On appeal, Mr. Butler argued first that the value of his inter-
est was defined by the shareholder agreement, and alternatively
that the going concern and/or goodwill value of the business
should not be included in the total value for equitable distribu-
tion purposes."'
First, the supreme court held that the terms of the sharehold-
er agreement were not determinative, but rather, the buy/sell
agreement was only one factor in valuing the interest.4 2 2 The
court then concluded that because the terms of Mr. Butler's
shareholder agreement were fixed and did not show the present
worth of the firm, the agreement itself was not determinative on
the issue of value.423
Second, the court held that the lower court erred when it
accounted for goodwill in the valuation of the business.' The
court held that the nature of the goodwill must first be deter-
mined.' If the goodwill is personal in nature, and not the
goodwill of the business in general, it is inappropriate to be
considered in equitable distribution.2 6 Specifically, personal
goodwill reflects the capability of earning future income, and
future income is not to be considered in equitable distribu-
tion.'
In this case the record showed that Mr. Butler's clients were
his responsibility, and that they identified not with the firm, but
with Mr. Butler in particular.428 The goodwill, then, was in-
alienable to Mr. Butler and could not be subjected to equitable
distribution.'29 Thus, the court remanded the case for a deter-
mination of the value of the business."
The court's outline of important factors in the valuation of a
business-capital accounts, accounts receivable, work in prog-
ress, appreciation and goodwill less accounts payable and other
liabilities-provide important guidance for this issue." The
majority's distinction between this case and McCabe, although
criticized by the dissent, is an important one as well. Sharehold-
er agreements are designed to define the rights of the share-
421. Id at 152.
422. Butler, 663 A.2d at 154 (distinguishing McCabe v. McCabe, 575 A.2d 87
(Pa. 1990)).
423. Id. at 155.
424. Id. (citing Stern v. Stern, 331 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1975)).
425. Id.
426. Id. at 156.
427. Butler, 663 A-2d at 156 (citing Hodge v. Hodge, 520 A.2d 15 (Pa. 1986)).
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 157.
431. Id. at 154 (citing favorably Stern v. Stem, 331 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1975)).
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holders-not their spouses.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS-FOSTER PAR-
ENT STANDING-Chester County Children & Youth Services v.
Cunningham, 656 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1995)--The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, in an equally divided opinion, affirmed the deci-
sion of the Pennsylvania Superior Court and held that foster
parents lack standing to seek adoption of foster children when
agency consent has been denied.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in an equally divided opin-
ion, affirmed the decision of the superior court in Chester County
Children & Youth Services v. Cunningham 2 and held that fos-
ter parents lack standing to seek adoption of foster children
when agency consent has been denied.'
In Cunningham, Donald and Middie Cunningham (the
"Cunninghams") filed a report of intention to adopt their two
foster children.' Chester County Children and Youth Services
(CCYS") informed the Cunninghams that the request for adop-
tion was denied."" The Cunninghams attempted to proceed
without the approval of CYS."6 CYS filed preliminary objec-
tions and asserted that the Cunninghams lacked the necessary
standing4 7 to adopt the foster children.438 The Cunninghams
asserted that CYS had unreasonably withheld the required con-
sent. 9 The trial court overruled the preliminary objections of
CYS and certified an immediate appeal to the superior court.'0
The superior court reversed the decision of the trial court and in
so reversing, sustained the preliminary objections of CYS."'
432. 656 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1995).
433. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1347.
434. Id. The two children were five and two years old. Id. The Chester County
Children and Youth Services ("CYS") had been awarded custody of the children when
the natural parents' rights had been terminated. Id.
435. Id. CYS indicated that the reasons for the denial of the Cunninghams' re-
quest for adoption were the advanced ages of the Cunninghams and the fact that
the Cunningharns had recently adopted a nine-year-old girl. Id. at 1348. Donald
Cunningham was 63 years old and Middie Cunningham was 50 years old at the
time of the adoption request. Id. at 1347.
436. Id. at 1348.
437. Id. Standing is defined as "a concept utilized to determine if a party is
sufficiently affected so as to insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the
court; it is the right to take the initial step that frames legal issues for ultimate
adjudication by court or jury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1405 (6th ed. 1990).
438. Cunningham, 656 A-2d at 1348.
439. Id.
440. Id. The supreme court noted: "The trial court overruled CYS's preliminary
objections, certifying that an immediate appeal of the interlocutory order might ma-
terially advance the ultimate termination of the matter." Id.
441. Id. The reports of intention to adopt were dismissed when the preliminary
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur" to
review the ability of foster parents to initiate an adoption pro-
ceeding without CYS approval.' The supreme court's Opinion
in Support of Affirmance, authored by Justice Flaherty, began
its analysis of the facts of the case by noting the established law
of Pennsylvania regarding adoption proceedings." That law
was established in In re Adoption of S.C.P.,"4 in which the su-
preme court held that foster parents are not included with those
individuals who have standing to adopt and therefore, CYS ap-
proval is necessary.' The supreme court also noted that the
United States Supreme Court has held that foster care is always
of a temporary nature and for a fixed period."7 The court rec-
ognized that foster parents play a critical role in the provision of
care for foster children.' However, the court noted, this role is
objections of CYS were sustained by the superior court. Id.
442. Allocatur is defined as a "word . . . used to denote that a writ or order
was allowed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
443. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1348.
444. Id. (Flaherty, J., Opinion in Support of Affirmance). See In re Adoption of
S.C.P., 527 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1987) (holding that foster parents, under 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2531(a) (1991 & Supp. 1995) (delineating who may file a report of intention
to adopt), may not file for adoption of their foster children)).
445. 527 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1987). The supreme court, in In re Adoption of S.C.P.,
stated: "[Floster parents have no standing to adopt a child placed in their custody
until the absolute, unequivocal, written consent of the children's legal custodian or
other person whose consent was necessary was given." In re Adoption of S.C.P., 527
A.2d at 1054.
446. Id.
447. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1350. In defining foster care, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania cited Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977),
which held that removal procedures whereby foster parents received ten days notice
prior to removal of foster children who had been in foster care for greater than
eighteen months afforded sufficient due process protection. Id. The Supreme Court,
in Smith, defined foster care as:
"[A] child welfare service which provides substitute family care for a planned
period for a child when his own family cannot care for him for a temporary or
extended period, and when adoption is neither desirable or possible." Thus, the
distinctive features of foster care are first, that it is care in a family, it is
noninstitutional substitute care," and second, "that it is for a planned peri-
od-either temporary or extended." This is unlike adoptive placement, which
implies a permanent substitution of one home for another.
Smith, 431 U.S. at 823-24.
448. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1350. The supreme court stated:
Although foster parents play an important, if not critical, role in the care of
dependent children, they are not necessarily qualified to serve as adoptive
parents. Thus it is that a child welfare agency may consent to adoption by
foster parents in one instance but not in another. Foster parents are merely
one example of the many categories of potential adopting parents, people who
have established positive relationships and played beneficial roles in the lives
of foster children.
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subordinate to the role of CYS as the supervising agency." 9
Because the legislature has deemed it necessary to obtain CYS
consent, without the proper consent, the court held, foster par-
ents lack standing to file a report of intention to adopt.'5
The Opinion in Support of Reversal, authored by Justice
Montemuro, argued that under the Adoption Act of 1970 any
individual may become an adoptive parent." Justice Mont-
emuro noted that it has often been common practice in Pennsyl-
vania for foster parents to adopt their foster children."2 Foster
parents, Justice Montemuro noted, have a substantial interest in
the welfare of their foster children.' This substantial interest,
Justice Montemuro recognized, should be sufficient to qualify
under the "standing" requirement. 4 The Opinion in Support
of Reversal also noted that courts retain the ability to dispense
with agency consent if it has been withheld unreasonably.'
Justice Montemuro noted that it is the ultimate duty and re-
sponsibility of courts to determine what is in the best interests
of the child." The Opinion in Support of Reversal further rec-
ognized that the ultimate determination of adoption, in a case
such as this, should not rest with CYS." 7
The Opinion in Support of Reversal recognized that a grant of
standing does nothing more than permit a party to be heard in
court.' The denial of standing, the opinion recognized, did not
449. Id.
450. Id. at 1351. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711(a)(5) (Supp. 1995). Section
2711(a)(5) states:
(a) General rule.-Except as otherwise provided in this part, consent to an
adoption shall be required of the following:
(5) The guardian of the person of an adoptee under the age of 18 years,
if any there be, or of the person or persons having the custody of the
adoptee, if any such person can be found, whenever the adoptee has no
parent whose consent is required.
Id. Section 2713(2) states: "The court, in its discretion, may dispense with consent
other than that of the adoptee to a petition for adoption when: . . . (2) the adoptee
is under 18 years of age and has no parent whose consent is required." Id.
§ 2713(2).
451. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1351 (Montemuro, J., Opinion in Support of
Reversal). See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2312 (1990). Section 2312 provides that "[a]ny
individual may become an adopting parent." Id.
452. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1351.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 1352.
456. Id. See supra note 450 for the text of 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2713(2) (per-
mitting a court ultimate discretion in waiving the consent requirement).
457. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1352.
458. ld. The Opinion in Support of Reversal stated:
[F]oster parents who obtain the consent of the agency can file a "Report of
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comport with the best interests of the children in this case. ' 9
The Opinion in Support of Affirmance failed to recognize the
major point of the Opinion in Support of Reversal, namely that a
grant of standing for foster parents seeking to adopt without
agency consent does nothing more than permit foster parents an
avenue for presentation of their argument to the court.' This
would clearly permit a more fair determination of adoption eligi-
bility, rather than a seemingly arbitrary decision by CYS.
VI. Taxation
A. DECISIONS
TAXATION-REAL ESTATE TAX SALE-NOTICE-UNINCORPORATED
AssocIATION-Krumbine v. Lebanon County Tax Claim Bureau,
663 A.2d 158 (Pa. 1995)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the Real Estate Tax Sale Law requires separate notification
of a pending real estate tax sale to each trustee of an unincorpo-
rated association listed on a deed.
In Krumbine v. Lebanon County Tax Claim Bureau,"' three
persons purchased and were deeded property as trustees of an
unincorporated association." To satisfy delinquent property
taxes, a county tax bureau sold the property and provided notice
of the tax sale to only one of the three trustees listed on the
property's deed."63 The trial court upheld the county tax
bureau's sale of the property, and the commonwealth court re-
versed, holding that the notification was per se insufficient.'
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the court
addressed the issue of whether the Real Estate Tax Law re-
quires separate notice to each person listed on the deed as
trustee of the property for an unincorporated association.4 '
Intent to Adopt" and gain review of the court to complete the adoption. How-
ever, those who fail to obtain the consent of the agency can go no further as
they have no "standing." This scheme is contrary to both the letter and spirit
of the Act. Our law clearly places the responsibility with the court to make
the final determination of what is in the best interests of the child.
Id. at 1353-54.
459. Id. at 1354.
460. Id.
461. 663 A.2d 158 (Pa. 1995).
462. Krumbine, 663 A.2d at 159.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.101 (1990)).
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The court began its opinion by stating that notice of a pending
tax sale must be provided to each owner of the property.' Be-
cause Pennsylvania's statutes do not recognize an unincorporat-
ed association as a legal entity that may own property, the court
found that an unincorporated association cannot be the "owner'
of property for purposes of notification of a pending tax sale. 7
The court held that the trustees of an unincorporated associa-
tion possess legal title to property that is in the unincorporated
association's name.468 When the trustees of an unincorporated
association are listed on the property's deed, the court found
that such trustees are the "owners" of the property. In conclu-
sion, the court held that the Real Estate Tax Law requires no-
tice of a pending tax sale to each trustee of an unincorporated
association listed on the property deed because such trustees are
the owners of the property.469
Krumbine expands the notice requirements of a pending tax
sale of property deeded to an unincorporated association's trust-
ees. By holding that an unincorporated association cannot be an
owner of property, the Krumbine court mandated separate notifi-
cation to each trustee as owners of the deeded property.
TAXATION-EARNED INCOME TAX-CONVERTIBLE DEBEN-
TURES-INTEREST AND APPRECIATION-Pugliese v. Township of
Upper St. Clair, 660 A.2d 155 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995)-The
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that an employee's
interest and appreciation earned on convertible debentures un-
der an employee incentive plan constitute investment income,
not compensation subject to local earned income tax.
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court excluded interest and
appreciation distributed on corporate convertible debentures
from taxation on earned income in Pugliese v. Township of Up-
per St. Clair.' In Pugliese, an employee participated in a com-
pany incentive compensation plan that guaranteed interest on
the company's convertible debentures and participation on any
appreciation in the company's stock.4 7' In 1990, the plan dis-
466. Id.
467. Krumbine, 663 A.2d at 160-61.
468. Id. at 161.
469. Id. at 162.
470. 660 A.2d 155 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995). A convertible debenture is a "[]long
term unsecured debt instrument, issued pursuant to an indenture . . . which may be
changed or converted into some other security (e.g. stock) usually at the option of
the holder." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 401 (6th ed. 1990).
471. Pugliese, 660 A.2d at 155.
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tributed to the employee a total amount of $760,798.88, of which
$317,600 represented a return on the employee's deferred
awards and $443,198.88 represented interest and apprecia-
tion.472 The employee reported only the $317,600 on his local
tax return; however, the employee's State W-2 Wage and Tax
Statement reported the employee's total plan distribution of
$760,798.88.Y In 1991, the plan distributed to the employee a
total amount of $99,103.69, of which $76,400 represented a re-
turn on the employee's deferred award and $2,273.69 represent-
ed interest and appreciation. 7' Again, the employee reported
on his local tax return only the portion of the distribution repre-
senting the return on his deferred award. 75
Local taxing authorities notified the employee that he owed
additional tax on the interest and appreciation portions of his
1990 and 1991 distributions. 476 The court of common pleas held
that the interest and appreciation earned under the employee's
incentive plan were not subject to local earned income taxa-
tion. 7 7 The local authorities then appealed to the common-
wealth court.78
The commonwealth court was thus confronted with the issue
of whether interest and appreciation distributed under a corpo-
rate incentive plan constitute compensation subject to local taxa-
tion.79 The commonwealth court analyzed the local regulation
that defined earned income and determined that the local regu-
lation impermissibly included items within earned income that




475. Id. at 156.
476. Pugliese, 660 A.2d at 155-56.
477. Id. at 156.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id. The local regulation provided that:
Earned income includes any item that is currently reportable on the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania Department of Revenue Form PA 40 "Gross Compensa-
tion" line, any item that is correctly reportable on the "Wages, Salaries, Tips,
Etc." line of the IRC Form 1040 or any item that is correctly reportable on
the "state wages, tips, etc." box of IRC Form W-2 and that portion of distrib-
uted or distributable S Corporation income that represents compensation for
services rendered. Examples include but are not limited to: income derived
from exercising non-qualified stock options; financial counseling services reim-
bursement; excess life insurance; spouse's travel reimbursement; moving ex-
pense reimbursement; and, mortgage differential.
Id. The court held that local municipalities are only authorized to tax: "Salaries,
wages, commissions, bonuses, incentive payments, fees, tips and other compensation
received by a person or his personal representative for services rendered, whether
1996
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wealth court concluded that interest and appreciation earned
under a corporate incentive plan constitute investment income,
not compensation subject to local earned income tax."s By ex-
cluding interest and appreciation on corporate, convertible de-
bentures from local taxation, the commonwealth court eliminat-
ed a potentially significant revenue source for local municipali-
ties.
B. LEGISLATION
Sales and Use Tax on Telephone Services
The Pennsylvania General Assembly amended the Sales and
Use Tax Statute to include a tax on telephone, telegraph and
telecommunications services. '82 The amendment imposes a six
percent tax on the gross amount charged to customers for tele-
phone, telegraph and telecommunications services.' An enti-
ty, subject to a similar tax in another state may apply for a tax
credit under the amendment.'
Net Loss Carryforward
The Pennsylvania Tax Code was amended to increase the net
loss carryforward.' For any taxable year, the total allowable
net loss deduction may not be greater than one million dol-
lars.486 However, the net loss deduction in any taxable year
may not include net losses from taxable years 1988 through
1994 in excess of five hundred thousand dollars. 7 Prior to the
amendment, the total allowable net loss deduction for any tax-
able year was limited to five hundred thousand dollars.4"
directly or through an agent, and whether in cash or in property." Id. (citing PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6913 (1972)).
481. Pughese, 660 A.2d at 157.











Inheritance Tax Exemption for Spousal Transfers
The Pennsylvania General Assembly amended the
Commonwealth's Inheritance Tax Laws to further eliminate
inheritance taxes on spousal transfers.' The amendment re-
duces the tax on spousal transfers to three percent for transfers
occurring between July 1, 1994 and January 1, 1995.490 Prior
to the amendment, a three percent tax was assessed on spousal
transfers occurring between July 1, 1994 and January 1, 1996,
with a one percent annual reduction in the tax until January 1,
1988, when the tax would have been completely eliminated." 1
VII. Employment Law
EMPLOYMENT LAW-VETERANS-HIRING PREFERENCES--Markel
v. McIndoe, 59 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1995)-The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals held that a Pennsylvania statute that requires an
employer to give preference to veterans in appointments or
promotions to civil service positions, regardless of their standing
on the eligibility list, is unconstitutional.
In Markel v. McIndoe,92 the plaintiff, William S. Markel
("Markel"), was denied a promotion to the rank of sergeant in
the Penn Hills Police Department (the "Department") despite
the fact that he was ranked second on the list of eligible candi-
dates after taking a civil service examination.'93 However, the
second, third, and fourth ranked candidates, all of whom were
veterans, were subsequently promoted to sergeant.'
Markel asserted that he was denied a promotion because, a
few years earlier, he had participated in the arrest and
prosecution of one of the defendants, Harry R. McIndoe
("McIndoe"), who was the Penn Hills Municipal Manager and
who also had authority over the promotions of Penn Hills police
officers. 95 Markel filed a lawsuit in which he alleged that the
489. 1995 Pa. Laws 21, § 2116 (to be codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§ 9116).
490. Id. § 2116(1.1)(i).
491. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 9116(a) (Supp. 1995).
492. 59 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1995).
493. Markel, 59 F.3d at 464-65.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 464. Markel had arrested Mclndoe five years earlier for driving
1996 609
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denial of promotion was a violation of his constitutional rights
because it was in retaliation for his earlier actions.496 Initially,
McIndoe and the Department contended that the promotional
decisions were based on objective criteria.497 However, the ulti-
mate argument that McIndoe and the Department prevailed in
the lower court was based on section 7104(b) of the Veteran's
Preference Act (the "VPA"), which mandates that veterans be
given preference when appointments or promotions are made to
public positions based on the results of a civil service exam. 9s
The district court concluded that, even though section 7104(b) of
the VPA was not a factor which was used by the Department in
its promotional decisions, it nonetheless prevented the Depart-
ment from promoting Markel ahead of any eligible veterans.4
Based on this conclusion, the district court granted summary
judgment for McIndoe and the Department, and Markel ap-
pealed.00
On appeal, Markel argued that section 7104(b) of the VPA
does not require that veterans be promoted over more qualified
candidates and, if it does so require, it violates both the Penn-
sylvania Constitution and the United States Constitution.01
The court examined Markel's first argument and concluded that,
under Pennsylvania case law, the language of the statute is such
that its provisions are mandatory and not optional." 2 The
court relied on Rasmussen v. Borough of Aspinwall,"'3 which
interpreted the phrase "shall give preference," as it is used in
section 7104(b) of the VPA, to mean that an employer must
appoint a certified veteran if one appears on the eligibility
under the influence of alcohol. Id. Subsequently, Markel testified against Mclndoe in
two separate hearings. Id.
496. Id. at 465. Markel brought the action under section 1983 of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), and averred that his constitutional
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments had been violated. Id.
497. Id.
498. Markel, 59 F.3d at 465. Section 7104(b) of the VPA provides:
[Wihenever any [veteran] possesses the requisite qualifications, and his name
appears on any eligible or promotional list, certified or furnished as the result
of any such civil service examination, the appointing or promoting power in
making an appointment or promotion to a public position shall give preference
to such [veteran], notwithstanding that his name does not stand highest on
the eligible or promotional list.
51 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7104(b) (1990).
499. Markel, 59 F.3d at 465.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id. at 466.
503. 519 A.2d 1074 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
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list.504 The court noted that although Rasmussen arose in the
context of an appointment rather than a promotion, the perti-
nent statutory language encompasses both modes of hiring.0 5
Having decided that section 7104(b) of the VPA creates a
mandatory promotional preference for veterans, the court ad-
dressed Markel's second argument that such a statute is uncon-
stitutional.50 6 The court examined the treatment that Pennsyl-
vania courts had given to earlier statutory schemes involving
hiring preferences for veterans.0 7 The court observed that in
Graham v. Schmid,"' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of two statutes designed to aid veter-
ans in obtaining job appointments." 9 In Graham, the court
held that a provision which required that a fifteen percent bonus
be added to the test scores of all veterans was invalid, but a
mandatory hiring preference for a veteran listed among the top
four successful examinees, without any bonus factored in, was
acceptable.1 0 The Graham court explained that, in order for a
veteran hiring preference to be sustained, it must not give prior-
ity to those veterans who would not otherwise meet the minimal
standards for the position, and it must reasonably reflect the
advantages which prior military service can bring to a civil ser-
vice position."'
Although the statutes in Graham dealt with appointments to
civil service positions, the court noted that Maurer v. O'Neill"
invalidated a similar statute which required a ten point increase
in the test scores of veterans who took a promotional exam."3
The O'Neill court drew a distinction between an original ap-
pointment and a promotion, and stated that the benefits of pre-
vious military service are diminished in a promotional context
because the other candidates for promotion will have received
the necessary job training and skills for the new position
504. Markel, 59 F.3d at 466 (citing Rasmussen, 519 A.2d at 1076).
505. Id. The court also noted that a recent common pleas court case held that
the language of section 7104(b) of the VPA creates an absolute preference when a
veteran is eligible for promotion to a civil service position (citing City of Pittsburgh
v. Fraternal Order of Police, No GD94-017598, at 14 (C.P. Allegh. Cty. Nov. 9,
1994)).
506. Id. at 467.
507. Id.
508. 3 A.2d 701 (Pa. 1938).
509. Markel, 59 F.3d at 467. The challenged statutes were part of the Third
Class City Law of June 23, 1931, 53 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 39405, 39407 (1957).
Id.
510. Id.
511. Id. at 468 (citing Graham, 3 A.2d at 704).
512. 83 A-2d 382 (Pa. 1951).
513. Markel, 59 F.3d at 469.
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through their civil service work experience, an advantage that
did not exist in the context of an original appointment. 14
With this historical precedent in mind, the court turned its
attention to the statute in question.515 The court observed that
section 7104(b) of the VPA is derived from the statutory provi-
sions in Graham and O'Neill which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had held unconstitutional.5"6 Additionally, the court ob-
served that the rationale and constitutional doctrine expressed
in the earlier cases was recently reaffirmed by the Pennsylvania
courts.51 7 Finally, the court noted that a recent case in the
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas directly addressed the
constitutionality of section 7104(b) of the VPA in a promotional
context and concluded that it violates the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution. 18 Therefore, the court held that the absolute prefer-
ence, with regard to promotions, granted to veterans by section
7104(b) of the Veterans' Preference Act is unconstitutional. 51
When deciding on promotions for civil service jobs, adminis-
trators must now treat veterans and non-veterans alike. Howev-
er, preference must still be given to veterans when original ap-
pointments are made to these positions. The court's separation
of these two situations represents a willingness to closely scruti-
nize hiring preferences to assure that they are narrowly tailored
to achieve their goals. Application of the strict standard used in
Markel to hiring preferences based upon factors other than mili-
tary service, such as race or gender, could possibly lead to the
elimination or limitation of these types of hiring preferences as
well.
514. Id. at 470 (citing O'Neill, 83 A.2d at 382-84).
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id. at 470-73. The court referenced a 1976 opinion by the Pennsylvania
Attorney General which relied on Graham and O'Neill and concluded that two other
sections of the VPA were unconstitutional. Id. (citing Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-17 at
54-55 (June 15, 1976)). Also, the court noted that a 1995 decision by the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court, which rejected a veteran's preference claim under section 7104(a)
of the VPA, relied on the minimal qualifications analysis in Graham. Id. at 472
(citing Brickhouse v. Spring-Ford Area Sch. Dist., 656 A.2d 483, 486-88 (Pa. 1995)).
Thus, the court concluded that it is likely that the appointment versus promotion
analysis in O'Neill is also still authoritative law. Id. at 473.
518. Markel, 59 F.3d at 474 n.13 (citing City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order
of Police, No. GD94-017598, at 14 (C.P. Allegh. Cty. Nov. 9, 1994)).
519. Id. at 474.
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EMPLOYMENT LAW-AT-WILL EMPLOYEE-LIMITATIONS ON AN
EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO TERMINATE AN AT-WILL EMPLOY-
EE-Highhouse v. Avery Transportation, 660 A.2d 1374 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995)-The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that an
employer violates public policy when it terminates an at-will
employee who files an unemployment compensation claim during
a period when the employee was not working.
In Highhouse v. Avery Transportation,20  the plaintiff,
Chester L. Highhouse ("Highhouse"), worked as a bus driver for
the defendant Avery Transportation ("Avery"). '2 Highhouse
was not a salaried employee and the amount of time he worked
was dependent upon the seasonal nature of Avery's business.5 22
During Avery's slow season in 1990 and early 1991, Highhouse
applied for and received unemployment compensation bene-
fits.523 Highhouse asserted that during the busy period that fol-
lowed in 1992, the number of assignments that he was given de-
creased significantly, as did the quality of the assignments. "
Highhouse claimed that his subsequent discussions with Avery
led him to believe that his situation would not improve unless
he agreed not to file additional unemployment claims. 25 De-
spite Avery's alleged threat, Highhouse filed another unemploy-
ment compensation claim in 1992.52 Subsequently, Highhouse
averred that Avery informed him that his services would only be
used in emergency situations."7 Highhouse stated that it was
for this reason that he declined to take a mandated drug test, at
his own expense. 25 Highhouse maintained that the employer's
action constituted an actual or constructive discharge, but Avery
disputed this and argued that Highhouse quit voluntarily when
he refused to take the required test. 29
In the subsequent wrongful discharge action filed by
Highhouse, the trial court entered summary judgment for
520. 660 A.2d 1374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
521. Highhouse, 660 A.2d at 1375.
522. Id. Generally, from May through September Highhouse was regularly em-
ployed. Id. However, from October through April Avery's business decreased and
Highhouse only worked sporadically, if at all. Id.
523. Id.
524. Id.
525. Id. at 1376.
526. Highhouse, 660 A.2d at 1376.
527. Id. Highhouse also stated that he did not receive a Christmas bonus, as
did other drivers employed by Avery. Id. He claimed that Avery told him that his




Avery. 3' However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed
the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.531 Initially, the court noted
that there were sufficient facts averred which, if believed, sup-
ported Highhouse's claim of a constructive discharge.5"' How-
ever, the court indicated that the main issue presented was
whether the nature of the constructive discharge, assuming that
a constructive discharge had occurred, was such as would sup-
port a cause of action by an at-will employee against an employ-
er.
533
The court first noted that the general rule in Pennsylvania is
that no cause of action exists against an employer for the dis-
charge of an at-will employee.5" However, a few exceptions to
this rule have been recognized, but only in very limited circum-
stances when the discharge violates public policy.35 The court
noted that no appellate court in Pennsylvania has considered
whether the discharge of an at-will employee for filing an unem-
ployment compensation claim violates public policy. 3 Howev-
er, the court observed that in Monkelis v. Scientific Systems
Services,37 a federal district court held that an employee sta-
ted a cause of action for wrongful discharge when he claimed
that his employer invented a reason to discharge him in order to
prevent the employee from collecting unemployment
compensation. 3 Likewise, the court stated that in Macken v.
Lord Corp.,"' the superior court recognized a cause of action
when an employee is fired in retaliation for filing a worker's
compensation claim." ° The court concluded that Pennsylvania
530. Id.
531. Highhouse, 660 A.2d at 1378.
532. Id. at 1376. The court noted that an at-will employee is constructively dis-
charged when the employer creates an intolerable working environment such that
the employee is forced to terminate the employment relationship. Id.
533. Id. The court rejected the employee's contention that he had an oral em-
ployment contract and held that he was an at-will employee, with no obligation by
either the employee or the employer to continue the employment for any period of
time. Id.
534. Id. at 1376-77 (citing Krajsa v. Keypunch, Inc., 622 A.2d 355, 358 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993)).
535. Id. at 1377 (citing Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 559 A.2d
917, 918 (Pa. 1989)). The court noted that an employer is liable if a discharge
threatens a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities. Id. (citing Macken v.
Lord Corp., 585 A.2d 1106, 1108 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) and Field v. Philadelphia
Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170, 1179 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)).
536. Highhouse, 660 A.2d at 1377.
537. 653 F. Supp. 680 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
538. Highhouse, 660 A.2d at 1377.
539. 585 A.2d 1106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
540. Highhouse, 660 A.2d at 1377.
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courts have long held that an employer violates public policy
when it discharges employees for exercising their legal
rights.541 The court further reasoned that an employee's right
to receive unemployment compensation is granted by the Com-
monwealth and is protected as an important expression of public
policy by provisions in the law which prevent its waiver or re-
lease.54 Therefore, the court held that the discharge of an em-
ployee in retaliation for filing an unemployment compensation
claim violates public policy and supports a claim for wrongful
discharge.5
The court's holding in Highhouse creates another public policy
exception to Pennsylvania's at-will employment doctrine. Howev-
er, Pennsylvania courts have generally been reluctant to grant
such exceptions and have only recognized a very limited number
of situations where the retaliatory termination of an at-will
employee violates public policy; these include a discharge for
reporting nuclear safety violations and a discharge for serving
on jury duty.' In Highhouse, the court relied on the legisla-
tive policy and intent behind the unemployment compensation
statute and its relationship to basic human needs to infer that a
vital public policy was at stake. Therefore, absent a clear indica-
tion from the legislature that the rights granted or protected by
a statute reflect an important public policy, it is unlikely that
additional exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine will be
recognized based upon an employee's assertion of such statutory
rights.'
EMPLOYMENT LAw-CONTRACTs--ENFORCEMENT OF A DISCRIMI-
NATORY NONCOMPETITION CLAUSE-DeMuth v. Miller, 652 A.2d
891 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)-The Pennsylvania Superior Court
held that a noncompetition clause, activated by the firing of an
employee for cause, is enforceable even though the specified
541. Id.
542. Id. at 1377-78 (quoting Warner Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd.,
153 A.2d 906 (Pa. 1959)). The court also stated that statutory law provides that
"[n]o agreement by an employee to waive, release, or commute his rights to [unem-
ployment] compensation . . . shall be valid." Id. at 1378 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 861 (1991)).
543. Id- at 1378.
544. See Greto v. Radix Sys., No. 93-6910, 1994 WL 719646, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 22, 1994). In Greto, the court held that a discharge of an employee in retalia-
tion for filing suit under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Act to
recover sales commissions did not violate public policy. Highhouse, 660 A.2d at 1378.
545. See Greto, 1994 WL 719646, at *3; PA. LAW WKLY., Aug. 7, 1995, at 1, 19




cause for the discharge is the employee's sexual orientation.
In DeMuth v. Miller," the defendant, Daniel C. Miller
("Miller") was employed by Donald L. DeMuth's ("DeMuth")
accounting firm as a professional management consultant.547
Miller had signed a series of one year employment contracts,
each of which contained a noncompetition clause.5" The clause
imposed liability on Miller if, within five years after he was
either fired for cause or had voluntarily terminated his employ-
ment, he opened a competing firm within a fifty-mile radius of
DeMuth's firm and provided such services to any of DeMuth's
clients.549 The noncompetition clause also contained a nonex-
clusive list of what constituted "cause," which included "homo-
sexuality."5"' After Miller appeared on television representing
a gay and lesbian coalition, he was fired by DeMuth pursuant to
the noncompetition clause's discharge provisions.55 ' Subse-
quently, Miller opened a competing firm and solicited DeMuth's
clients.552 When Miller failed to compensate DeMuth pursuant
to the agreement, DeMuth brought this action to enforce the
damages provision of the noncompetition clause of the con-
tract.55 The trial court found in favor of DeMuth and awarded
damages based on the employment contract and Miller ap-
pealed. 54
On appeal, Miller presented several arguments, one of which
alleged that judicial enforcement of the noncompetition clause
constituted discriminatory state action that interfered with the
defendant's right to practice his profession, in violation of both
the Pennsylvania and United States constitutions.5 5 Judge
546. 652 A.2d 891 (Pa. Super. Ct.), allocatur denied, 665 A.2d 469 (Pa. 1995).
547. DeMuth, 652 A-2d at 892.
548. Id.
549. Id. The damages were set at 125% of the charges for the previous twelve
month period for any services rendered to DeMuth's current or former clients. Id.
550. Id. at 892-93.
551. Id. at 893.
552. DeMuth, 652 A.2d at 893.
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. Id. at 897-98. Miller also argued that there was no employment contract
in force at the time he was discharged, but the court held that although the previ-
ous contract had expired several months before the discharge, the conduct of the
parties during the interim evidenced an intent to continue their contractual relation-
ship in accordance with the provisions of the expired contract. Id. at 893-96. Another
argument advanced by Miller, that the terms of the restrictive covenant were unrea-
sonable and amounted to a penalty, was rejected by the court as having been
waived by Miller because it had not been raised prior to the appeal or addressed by
the trial court. Id. at 896.
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Popovich, writing for the court, first addressed the question of
whether the constitutional issues had been properly preserved
for appeal because they were first raised in Miller's post-trial
brief and oral argument.6 The court concluded that because
the trial court had exercised its discretion and addressed Miller's
constitutional claims in its opinion denying Miller a new trial,
the question was adequately preserved for review."7 In sup-
port of his position, Miller relied on Shelley v. Kraemer,"s in
which the United States Supreme Court held that judicial en-
forcement of restrictive covenants based on race amount to a
denial of equal protection."9 However, the court distinguished
Shelley from the present situation on the basis of property
rights.6 o The court noted that while a reasonable expectation
of continued employment is a protected property right, Miller's
argument was restricted to the implementation of the penalty
provision contained in the noncompetition clause, and did not
encompass the termination of his employment.6 1 Therefore,
the court refused to decide the specific question of whether an
employee's termination for homosexuality violates public policy
or amounts to a denial of equal protection. 2 However, the
court stated that discriminatory treatment based on the publica-
tion of one's sexual preference is not an actionable claim under
Pennsylvania law or under the Equal Protection or Due Process
Clauses of the United States Constitution." Therefore, the
court held that enforcement of the terms of the noncompetition
agreement in this case did not violate public policy and were not
contrary to any state or federal constitutional provisions.'"
In a concurring opinion, Judge Olszewski agreed with the
556. Id. at 896.
557. DeMuth, 652 A.2d at 896 (citing Thatcher's Drugs of West Goshen, Inc. v.
Consolidated Supermarkets, Inc., 571 A.2d 490, 494 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), rev'd on
other grounds, 636 A.2d 156 (Pa. 1994)).
558. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
559. DeMuth, 652 A.2d at 898 n.3 (citing Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20-21). In Shel-
ley, homeowners had signed contracts that restricted the sale of their property to
Caucasians. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4-5. After some of the homeowners had sold their
land to African-Americans, the remaining homeowners sued to enforce the agree-
ments. Id. at 5-6.
560. DeMuth, 652 A.2d at 898 n.3.
561. Id.
562. Id. at 898 n.3, 900 n.4.
563. Id. at 900.
564. Id. Additionally, the court noted that the reason DeMuth sought judicial
action was because Miller had opened a business in direct competition with
DeMuth's finm, and not because of Miller's sexual preferences. Id. Thus, DeMuth
sought to penalize Miller for the solicitation of DeMuth's business clients, not for
Miller's sexual orientation. Id.
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majority's decision to permit enforcement of the restrictive cove-
nant, but concluded that judicial involvement did not amount to
state action in a constitutional sense.565 Therefore, the concur-
rence argued that the majority's discussion of the constitutional
issues was unwarranted.5 66 Judge Olszewski contended that
Shelley was distinguishable because it directly involved state
action in a discriminatory purpose." 7 And, while he conceded
that judicial action that indirectly supports discrimination is
also unconstitutional, Judge Olszewski concluded that the cour-
t's involvement in the instant matter was too far removed from
the alleged discrimination to raise the issue." Therefore,
Judge Olszewski opined that the only question that faced the
court was the propriety of the noncompetition agreement, which
had clearly passed constitutional muster. 69
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Johnson concluded that judicial
enforcement of the penalty provisions of the noncompetition
clause, which was triggered by a facially discriminatory provi-
sion, violated the United States Constitution.57 ° Judge Johnson
contended that the present situation was one in which the
court's assistance aided another in furthering and profiteering
from a discriminatory plan.57" ' Judge Johnson argued that, ab-
sent judicial intervention, Miller would not owe damages."
Thus, it was the state's choice to enforce the covenant and there-
by sanction the discriminatory conduct which triggered it, as
opposed to the parties' voluntary compliance with its terms. 73
Finally, Judge Johnson asserted that the discriminatory conduct
engaged in by the state was without any rational basis, and
therefore it was constitutionally deficient. 74 Because the dis-
565. DeMuth, 652 A.2d at 900-01 (Olszewski, J., concurring).
566. Id.
567. Id. at 901.
568. Id. (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)). Judge Olszewski noted
that the discrimination occurred with regard to Miller's termination but the propri-
ety of the dismissal was not challenged by him. Id. at 902. Therefore, it was a
"done deal" in which there was absolutely no court involvement. Id.
569. Id. at 902.
570. DeMuth, 652 A.2d at 903 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
571. Id. at 904.
572. Id. at 905.
573. Id. (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953)).
574. Id. at 908. Judge Johnson noted that the issue of whether or not homosex-
uals are a suspect class, for purposes of analysis under the Equal Protection Clause,
has not been determined. Id. at 905. However, whether discrimination based on
sexual orientation is entitled to higher scrutiny was not relevant in this situation,
because Judge Johnson concluded that the challenged conduct failed to pass the
lowest standard because the disparity of treatment was not rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose. Id.
Vol. 34:553
1996 PA Recent Developments-Employment Law 619
charge was not based on nondiscriminatory reasons unrelated to
Miller's sexual orientation, Judge Johnson stated that the only
purpose served by state action would be to give effect to private
prejudice, and this was not a legitimate governmental objec-
tive.Th
Although the court's decision clearly indicates that current
Pennsylvania law does not grant special protection to homosexu-
als in an employment context, it leaves unanswered the question
of whether a discharge based on sexual orientation is unlawful
discrimination. The court's reluctance to address this issue is
evident in that both the majority opinion and the concurring
opinion endeavor to separate the potential discrimination issue
from the employment issue altogether. Thus, the effect of the
court's ruling, although it does not represent a departure from
the prevailing viewpoint, coupled with a strong dissent, serves to
amplify the potential viability of this type of equal protection
claim.
VIII. Environmental Law
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-HAZARDOUS SITE CLEANUP
ACT-PRVATE CAUSE OF ACTION-Smith v. Weaver, 665 A.2d
1215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)-The Pennsylvania Superior Court
held that a private cause of action to recover response and clean-
up costs for environmental contamination exists under
Pennsylvania's Hazardous Site Cleanup Act.
In Smith v. Weaver,576 the plaintiff, Thomas L. Smith
("Smith"), purchased property from the defendant, Pauline
Weaver ("Weaver"). 77 The property had formerly been operat-
ed as a gasoline station.578 Weaver agreed to sell all of the
equipment located on the property and the sales agreement spe-
cifically listed three underground steel storage tanks.57 Ten
years after the purchase, Smith removed the underground stor-
age tanks and discovered that there were two other tanks locat-
ed on the property.58 Both of the tanks had leaked contami-
575. DeMuth, 652 A.2d at 907-08.
576. 665 A.2d 1215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
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nants and pollutants into the surrounding soil.58' Smith noti-
fied the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources
(the "DER"), which required him to remove the tanks and the
contaminated soil. 5 2  Smith then sued Weaver under
Pennsylvania's Hazardous Site Cleanup Act (the "HSCA")5 3 to
recover the costs associated with the cleanup activity." 4 The
trial court held, inter alia, that no private cause of action exists
under the HSCA to recover the costs associated with the cleanup
of contaminated property.5
On appeal, the court noted that no Pennsylvania appellate
court had ruled on the specific issue of the existence of a private
cause of action under the HSCA.ss 6 However, the superior
court noted that a United States district court had considered
the question in Toole v. Gould, Inc.5"7 and concluded that a pri-
vate cause of action is appropriate under the HSCA to carry out
its goals."s Using the analysis in Toole as a guide, the court
noted that the language of the enforcement provisions in section
6020.1101 of the HSCA place no specific limitations on who can
sue for response and cleanup costs."5 9 Furthermore, the court
noted that the liability provisions in section 702 of the HSCA
provide that one who commits a violation of the HSCA is liable
to the state for any remedial cleanup costs and to any other
person who incurred necessary response costs."' The court
581. Id.
582. Weaver, 665 A.2d at 1217.
583. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 35, §§ 6020.101-.1305 (1993 & Supp. 1995).
584. Weaver, 665 A.2d at 1217. Smith alleged that Weaver knew or should
have known about the existence of the leaking underground tanks at the time of the
sale and her failure to disclose that information constituted a negligent misrepresen-
tation about the condition of the property. Id.
585. Id. at 1220. The trial court also dismissed several other counts of Smith's
complaint that were premised on the assumption that Weaver was still the legal
owner of the leaking tanks. Id. at 1217-19. The trial court held that the sales agree-
ment conveyed all of the tanks to Smith, even those that were not specifically listed.
Id. at 1217. However, the superior court concluded that the sales agreement was
ambiguous and disputed issues of fact existed as to the ownership of the leaking
tanks. Id. Therefore, the court reversed the dismissal of those allegations based on
Weaver's ownership of the leaking tanks. Id. at 1217-19.
586. Id. at 1220.
587. 764 F. Supp. 985 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
588. Weaver, 665 A.2d at 1220 (citing Toole, 764 F. Supp. at 993).
589. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part: "[A] release of a hazardous sub-
stance . . . shall constitute a public nuisance. Any person allowing such a re-
lease . . . shall be liable for the response costs caused by the release." PA. STAT
ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.1101.
590. Weaver, 665 A.2d at 1220-21. The statute provides:
[A] person who is responsible for a release . . . of a hazardous substance from
a site . . . is strictly liable for the following response costs and damages. ...
Reasonable and necessary or appropriate costs of remedial response incurred
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then adopted the analysis used by the Toole court, which rea-
soned that these provisions only have meaning if they are con-
strued to establish a right of recovery for a person other than
the government.59' Thus, the court held that a private cause of
action exists under the HSCA."2
The court also addressed several other issues of statutory
construction presented by the existence of a private cause of
action. The court noted that section 1301(a) of the HSCA, which
delays enforcement of any recovery provisions until the DER has
instituted an administrative or judicial enforcement action, do
not apply in a private cause of action. 9 Additionally, sections
6020.505 and 6020.506 of the HSCA, which require the devel-
opment of an administrative record and the selection of a reme-
dial response plan based on that record, are also inapplicable in
a private cause of action.59 The court held that none of these
directives were required to be carried out in a private cause of
action because to do so would undermine the purpose of the
HSCA, which is to promote prompt and efficient cleanup of con-
taminated sites."'
The court's decision in Weaver allows individuals to bring a
suit under the HSCA to recover costs associated with environ-
mental cleanup without significant involvement by the DER. By
not requiring state involvement in the action, the court demon-
strated a preference for private industry to respond to environ-
mental concerns. Although there is always a danger of frivolous
litigation motivated by monetary interests in allowing individu-
als to bring a cause of action previously limited to the state,
these concerns are greatly outweighed by the potential advan-
tages of private actions. By limiting the involvement of the DER,
and its attendant bureaucratic and regulatory burdens, individu-
als will be able to repair environmental damage quicker and
more efficiently without any risk of loss or lengthy delays in
recovery. This in turn may force polluters to think twice about
the potential costs associated with their actions, thus resulting
by the United States, the Commonwealth, or a political subdivision. Other
reasonable and necessary or appropriate costs of response incurred by any
other person.
35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6020.702.
591. Weaver, 665 A.2d at 1221 (citing Toole, 764 F. Supp. at 993).
592. Id.
593. Id. Section 1301(a) of the HSCA provides: "[An owner shall not be subject
to enforcement orders or recovery provisions of this Act until the [DER] has institut-
ed an administrative or judicial enforcement action . . . and the owner . . . has
failed to comply." PA. STAT ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.1301(a).
594. Weaver, 665 A.2d at 1222 (citing PA. STAT ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6020.505-.506).
595. Id. at 1221-22.
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in greater environmental protection.
IX. Estates and Trusts
ESTATES AND TRUSTS-SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS-ABILITY OF
CREDITORS TO REACH TRUST INCOME-Schreiber v. Kellogg, 50
F.3d 264 (3d Cir. 1995)-The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt section
157(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which allows
creditors to reach spendthrift trust interests in satisfaction of
claims for services or materials that have preserved or benefit-
ted the beneficiary's interest in the trust.
In Schreiber v. Kellogg,59  attorney Palmer K. Schreiber
("Schreiber") was retained by Christopher G. Kellogg ("Kellogg")
to increase the purchase price in a stock sale."9 7 Kellogg was a
contingent income beneficiary of a trust, the principal of which
was composed of the stock. 98 The trustees had been offered
forty million dollars for the stock and, partially as a result of
Schreiber's efforts, the ultimate purchase price was sixty million
dollars. 9 After the stock was sold, Schreiber filed an action on
behalf of Kellogg against the trustees, alleging negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty.' The suit was settled and Kellogg
agreed to pay Schreiber eighty thousand dollars for his
work.01 Kellogg failed to pay the amount due and Schreiber
sued for breach of contract and obtained a judgment against
Kellogg."0 2 To satisfy the judgment, Schreiber sought to exe-
cute on Kellogg's interest in the trust.63
The district court denied Schreiber's motion and held that the
testator had intended to provide a spendthrift provision' in
596. 50 F.3d 264 (3d Cir. 1995).
597. Schreiber, 50 F.3d at 266.
598. Id. at 265.
599. Id. at 266. Schreiber was awarded $117,000 in counsel fees for his efforts
in the stock sale by the Montgomery County Orphans' Court. Id.
600. Id.
601. Id.
602. Schreiber, 50 F.3d at 266.
603. Id.
604. Id. at 267. The court defined a "spendthrift trust" as one in which the in-
terest of the beneficiary cannot be assigned by the beneficiary or reached by the
beneficiary's creditors. Id. (citing AUSTIN W. Scorr & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS § 151, at 83 (4th ed. 1987)).
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the trust to protect Kellogg's interest.0 5 Furthermore, the dis-
trict court rejected Schreiber's claim, which was based on section
157(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (the "Restate-
ment"), that he was entitled to reach the trust proceeds, regard-
less of the spendthrift nature of the trust, because the claim
arose out of services rendered to benefit the interest of the bene-
ficiary.e"e The district court held that Pennsylvania courts
would not apply section 157(c) of the Restatement under the
circumstances of this case." On appeal, the court of appeals
conducted a de novo review of the district court's determination
of Pennsylvania law and concluded that Pennsylvania courts
would apply section 157(c) of the Restatement.6 8
Initially, the court addressed the issues of the applicable stan-
dard of review and the district court's determination of the
spendthrift nature of the trust."' The court determined that,
under Pennsylvania law, interpretation of a will is generally a
question of law when a court relies solely on the language of the
will and does not consider extrinsic evidence, as was the case
here.6"0 Thus, review of the trial court's decision was subject to
a de novo standard, rather than a clearly erroneous
standard. "1 The court then determined that the testator had
intended to protect the bequests made to his great-grandchil-
dren, of whom Kellogg was one, with a spendthrift provision
contained elsewhere in the will.6 ' Having decided that the
trust in question was a spendthrift trust, and therefore protect-
ed from the reach of creditors, the court turned its attention to
the issue of whether a Pennsylvania court would accept section
157(c) of the Restatement as an exception to the general rule
605. Schreiber v. Kellogg, 849 F. Supp. 382, 389 (E.D. Pa. 1994), rev'd, 50 F.3d
264 (3d Cir. 1995).
606. Schreiber, 849 F. Supp. at 394. Section 157(c) provides: "[A]lthough a trust
is a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the interest of the beneficiary can be
reached in satisfaction of an enforceable claim against the beneficiary . . . for ser-
vices rendered and materials furnished which preserve or benefit the interest of the
beneficiary." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1974).
607. Schreiber, 849 F. Supp. at 394.
608. Schreiber, 50 F.3d at 267, 275.
609. Id. at 266-67.
610. Id.
611. Id. at 266 n.3, 267.
612. Id. at 269. The dispute centered around whether a spendthrift provision in
the third paragraph of the will extended to the bequest made to the testator's great-
grandchildren in the eighth paragraph of the will. Id. at 268. The court found that
the language in the eighth paragraph, which stated that it was "subject to the pro-
visions herein previously contained," subjected all bequests therein to the spendthrift
provisions of the earlier paragraph. Id. at 269.
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against the alienation of spendthrift trusts.613
The court noted that although no Pennsylvania court has
considered the application of section 157(c), much of the general
common law regarding spendthrift trusts has derived from
Pennsylvania case law.1 4 With this in mind, the court noted
that Pennsylvania has either adopted or approved of all of the
other exceptions contained in section 157 of the Restate-
ment."5 The exception in section 157(a), relating to support
claims, has long been allowed by Pennsylvania courts and is
effectively embodied in a Pennsylvania statute. 16 The excep-
tion for claims for necessary services rendered to the beneficiary,
contained in section 157(b), was recently cited with approval by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.1 7 The court noted that the
exception for claims by the United States has been applied to re-
cover unpaid taxes from the beneficiary. 8' Moreover, the court
stated that it was unable to find any Pennsylvania case that
declined to follow, or even criticize, section 157 of the Restate-
ment.1 9 Finally, the court held that all of the exceptions con-
tained within section 157 override the normal operation of a
spendthrift trust and are therefore applied without any consid-
eration of a testator's intent."'
The court asserted that the fundamental purposes of section
157(c) are to prevent the unjust enrichment of a beneficiary and
to ensure that beneficiaries can obtain the means by which to
protect their interests.6 2' The court concluded that the applica-
613. Schreiber, 50 F.3d at 271.
614. Id. at 272.
615. Id. at 273-75. In addition to § 157(c), the remaining portions of § 157
provide:
Although a trust is a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the interest of
the beneficiary can be reached in satisfaction of an enforceable claim against
the beneficiary, (a) by the wife or child of the beneficiary for support, or by
the wife for alimony; (b) for necessary services rendered to the beneficiary or
necessary supplies furnished to him; ...(d) by the United States or State to
satisfy a claim against a beneficiary.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157.
616. Schreiber, 50 F.3d at 273. The court cited In re Stewart's Estate, 5 A.2d
910 (Pa. 1939) and 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6112 (1992), which provides that "[i]ncome
of a trust subject to spendthrift or similar provisions shall nevertheless be liable for
the support of anyone whom the income beneficiary shall be under a legal duty to
support." 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6112.
617. Schreiber, 50 F.3d at 274 (citing Lang v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 528 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1987)).
618. Id. (citing Quigley Estate, 22 Pa. D. & C.2d 598 (Mont. Cty. Orphans' Ct.
1960)).
619. Id. at 275.
620. Id. at 276.
621. Id. at 271.
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tion of section 157(c) in a situation where an attorney is seeking
to be paid for services rendered in connection with a trust is
consistent with these interests. 2 The court noted that the on-
ly other state that has examined the application of section 157(c)
did so in a similar situation and reached the same conclu-
sion.6  In Evans & Luptak v. Obolensky,62' the Michigan
Court of Appeals applied section 157(c) and reversed a lower
court decision which had denied execution on the assets of a
spendthrift trust by a law firm that had been hired by the bene-
ficiary to obtain the best price for the sale of the primary trust
assets, but had not been paid for its services."' Therefore, the
court held that section 157(c) of the Restatement applies in
Pennsylvania and was applicable to the present situation.626
However, the court limited the application of section 157(c) to
those situations where there is an actual preservation of, or
benefit to, the interests of the beneficiary, as opposed to only a
good faith attempt to preserve or benefit the interests of the
beneficiary, without tangible results.627 The court concluded
that this restriction furthers the purposes of the Restatement
but limits the invasion of a spendthrift trust to extraordinary
situations.6 Thus, the court remanded the case to the district
court for a determination of whether Schreiber's services provid-
ed a tangible benefit to Kellogg's interests in the trust. 29
By recognizing another exception by which the assets of a
spendthrift trust may be reached, the court has given creditors
an additional tool by which they can obtain payment for their
services. However, because of the nature of this particular excep-
tion to the inviolability of a spendthrift trust, the likely benefi-
ciaries of the court's decision will be lawyers and financial plan-
ners. Fortunately, by requiring such a creditor to demonstrate
that it has provided an actual benefit to the trust interests,
rather than simply a good faith effort, the court has effectively
safeguarded the interests of the trust beneficiary from potential
opportunists. Because this is in keeping with the general pur-
622. Schreiber, 50 F.3d at 275.
623. Id. at 272-73.
624. 487 N.W.2d 521 (Mich. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 496 N.W.2d 289 (Mich.
1992).
625. Schreiber, 50 F.3d at 273, 275.
626. Id. at 275-76.
627. Id. at 277.
628. Id. at 277-78. The court relied on the comments in section 157 of the Re-
statement and on Pennsylvania case law which indicates that assets of spendthrift
trusts should only be intruded upon in exceptional situations. Id.
629. Id. at 278.
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poses of all of the Restatement's exceptions to the inalienability
of a spendthrift trust, it is likely that the circuit court's holding
will be adopted by Pennsylvania courts.
ESTATES AND TRUSTS-DISTRIBUTION-ABILITY OF A COURT TO
REDISTRIBUTE A DECEDENT'S ESTATE-In re Donald T. Jones,
660 A.2d 76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)-The Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that a trial court has the authority to compel the
original distributees of an estate to relinquish a portion of their
inheritance to newly discovered heirs of the decedent, despite
the absence of fraud in the administration of the estate.
In In re Donald T. Jones,"' the administrator of a decedent's
estate distributed the proceeds of the estate to five original
distributees, maternal cousins of the decedent, following the
issuance of a Decree of Distribution and Adjudication. 1 Short-
ly thereafter, the administrator received notice from the assign-
ee of three paternal cousins of the decedent that there were
additional heirs to the estate."3 2 The administrator immediate-
ly notified the five original distributees of the possibility of addi-
tional heirs and advised the distributees to retain their dis-
tributive shares in full until the matter was resolved.' The
administrator later suggested that the five original heirs deposit
half of their inheritance in an interest bearing account until the
dispute was settled, but the original distributees refused and
instead retained counsel."s
More than one year after the administrator had been notified
of the possible existence of the additional heirs, the assignee for
the additional heirs filed a Petition for Review and Rehearing
pursuant to section 3521 of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries
Code (the "Probate Code"). "35 After a hearing before a master,
630. 660 A.2d 76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
631. Jones, 660 A.2d at 78. The decedent died on November 26, 1989 and ad-
vertisement of the estate for probate began on December 5, 1989. Id. A first and
final account was filed on February 23, 1990. Id. The Decree of Distribution was
issued on May 7, 1990, and actual distribution was made by the administrator on
May 29, 1990. Id.
632. Id. The three paternal cousins were not aware of their status until they
were contacted on May 22, 1990 by the assignee, a company that specialized in
locating missing heirs. Id. at 78 n.4. However, the cousins did not learn whose es-
tate they were heirs to until June 11, 1990, after the assignment agreements had
been finalized. Id.
633. Id. at 78-79.
634. Id. at 79.
635. Id. Section 3521 of the Probate Code provides:
[11f any party in interest shall, within five years after the final confirmation of
any account of a personal representative, file a petition to review any part of
the account or of an auditor's report, or of the adjudication, or of any decree
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the trial court accepted the master's recommendation that the
estate be redistributed according to the petition. 6' The original
distributees appealed.
3 7
During its review of the decision, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court noted that it was unaware of any similar case decided
under the current statute. 38 However, the court stated that
review of a confirmed distribution has normally been granted
only when the face of the record indicates errors of law, or new
matter has arisen since the distribution, or equity requires a
review and no person will suffer because of it.' The court
held that the present situation fell into the second category and
the trial court properly allowed a review.' The court then
turned its attention to the original distributees' argument that a
court could only order the return and redistribution of a
decedent's estate after an actual distribution had been made if
fraud was present in the original distribution."'
The court noted that the original distributees' based their
argument on cases decided under earlier statutes which were
mere predecessors to the current version. 2 The court noted
that the relevant statutes enacted in 1840, 1917, and 1949 ex-
pressly precluded the court from granting a review or redistri-
bution with regard to property that had already been distributed
to an heir.' However, the present statute, codified at section
3521 of the Probate Code, does not expressly bar review after
distribution has been made.' The court also noted that the
of distribution, setting forth specifically alleged errors therein, the court shall
give such relief as equity and justice shall require.
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3521 (1992).
636. Jones, 660 A.2d at 79. The petition requested that the estate be redistrib-
uted so that both the original distributees and the newly discovered heirs each re-
ceived a 118 share. Id.
637. Id.
638. Id. at 81.
639. Id. at 80 (citing Estate of Roart, 568 A.2d 182, 185 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)).
640. Id.
641. Jones, 660 A.2d at 80. There were no allegations of fraud contained in the
Petition for Review. Id. at 80 n.6.
642. Id. at 80. The distributees relied on Estate of Mack, 169 A. 468 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1933), Downing v. Felheim, 164 A. 598 (Pa. 1932) and Ferguson v. Yard, 30
A. 517 (Pa. 1894). Each of these cases held that the redistribution of an estate is
prevented if an actual distribution had already been made and no fraud was
present. Id.
643. Id. Section 721 of the Fiduciary's Act of 1949 provided that a court could
give "such relief as equity and justice shall require" but the court was precluded
from permitting a review "as to any property distributed by the personal representa-
tive in accordance with a decree of court before the filing of the petition." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit 20, § 320.721 (1949) (amended 1970) (current version at 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3521 (1992)).
644. Jones, 660 A.2d at 80. See supra note 635 for the text of section 3521 of
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Uniform Probate Code, although not adopted in Pennsylvania,
also appears to authorize the return and redistribution of inheri-
tance after an actual distribution has been made.' Thus the
court concluded that the previous requirements of fraud or pre-
distribution claims against the estate which were necessary to
obtain review of an estate distribution have been abolished.'
The court noted that the only remaining limitations are the five
year time limit and the court's determination of equity and jus-
tice, as provided by section 3521 of the Probate Code.' v
The court's decision in Jones clearly lays to rest any lingering
doubts about the ability of lost heirs to reclaim inheritances
from distributees of a decedent's estate. The official elimination
of fraud as a prerequisite to redistribution should be a boon to
companies that locate missing heirs in exchange for a percentage
of the inheritance. However, at the same time, it will create un-
certainty among distributees of estates of all sizes as to the
security of their inheritances for up to five years after distribu-
tion. The statutorily mandated requirements of equity and jus-
tice apparently only assure that an estate is redistributed to
legitimate lost heirs. The court did not indicate that these re-
quirements are also operative with regard to the disposition of
the inheritance by the original distributees. Thus, given the
court's reliance on the Uniform Probate Code, which holds an
original distributee liable for the value of the property as of the
date of distribution, the distributee of a decedent's estate could
face significant liability long after the resources to meet that
debt have been exhausted.
ESTATES AND TRUSTS-JOINT TENANTS-ABILITY OF AN
EXECUTOR TO DISCLAIM A DECEDENT'S SURVIVORSHIP INTER-
EST-In re Estate of Bernecker, 654 A.2d 246 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1995)-The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that an
executor may terminate a decedent's survivorship interest in a
joint tenancy by timely filing a disclaimer, and thereby avoid the
double imposition of state inheritance tax.
the Probate Code.
645. Jones, 660 A.2d at 81 n.7. Section 3-909 of the Uniform Probate Code
provides that a distributee of property improperly distributed is liable to return the
property and its income, or its value as of the date of distribution if the property
has been disposed of. Id. (citing UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-909 (1983 and Supp.
1994)).
646. Id. at 81.
647. Id.
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In In re Estate of Bernecker,' Laura N. Bernecker (the
"decedent's sister") died six months before Eugenia Bernecker
(the "decedent") and left her entire estate to the decedent.' 9 At
the time of her death, the decedent's sister held stocks and bank
accounts with the decedent as a joint tenant with the right of
survivorship.65 ° Both the decedent's sister and the decedent
named each other as their beneficiaries and appointed Harry F.
Price (the "executor") as their executor and alternative beneficia-
ry."' Upon the decedent's death, and after all known debts of
both estates were paid, the executor filed a Petition to File a
Disclaimer on behalf of the decedent, based on section 6202 of
the Probates, Estates, and Fiduciaries Code (the "Probate
Code").652 The purpose of the disclaimer was to avoid paying
the state inheritance tax twice, due to the duplicate administra-
tion of the two estates.5 3
The orphans' court granted the executor's petition to disclaim
the decedent's interest in all of the property passing to her
through her sister's will, as well as the decedent's survivorship
interest in all of the jointly owned assets."M The Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Revenue (the "Depart-
ment") appealed the ruling and asserted that a disclaimer of
jointly held assets is not allowed. 55 The Department based its
argument on section 9116(c) of the Inheritance and Estate Tax
Act (the "Tax Act").56 The Department contended that the Tax
648. 654 A.2d 246 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
649. Bernecker, 654 A.2d at 247.
650. Id.
651. Id.
652. Id. Section 6202 of the Probate Code provides generally that a disclaimer
of an interest in property may be filed on behalf of a decedent by the decedent's
personal representative, but the disclaimer is not effective until authorized by a
court after it has determined that the disclaimer will not materially prejudice the
rights of creditors, heirs, or beneficiaries of the decedent. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6202
(1992).
653. Bernecker, 654 A.2d at 247.
654. Id.
655. Id.
656. Id. at 248. The section of the Tax Act on which the Department relied
provides in pertinent part:
When any person entitled to a distributive share of an estate, whether under
an inter vivos trust, a will or the intestate law, renounces his right to receive
the distributive share receiving therefor no consideration, or exercises his elec-
tive rights . . . receiving therefor no consideration other than the interest in
assets passing to him as the electing spouse, the tax shall be computed as
though the persons who benefit by such renunciation or election were original-
ly designed to be the distributees, conditioned upon an adjudication or decree
of distribution expressly confirming distribution to such distributees.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 9116(c) (Supp. 1995).
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Act only allows someone who is entitled to a distributive share
of an estate to disclaim an interest received from a decedent. 57
But, the Department argued, because the interest that the dece-
dent obtained from her sister's estate was a survivorship inter-
est, it was acquired by operation of law and was not a distribu-
tive share, and therefore it fell outside the scope of the stat-
ute.
65 8
The executor contended that section 6201 of the Probate Code
allowed the decedent to disclaim any interest in property, in-
cluding a survivorship interest. 59 The executor asserted that
such a disclaimer converted the joint tenancy interest into a
tenancy in common interest.6" The executor also argued, un-
der section 9116(c) of the Tax Act, that such an interest may be
disclaimed for inheritance tax purposes if it is filed within nine
months of the death of the first tenant.6 ' Furthermore, the ex-
ecutor stated that he had met the requirements of section 6202
of the Probate Code, relating to disclaimers filed by persons
other than the beneficiary. 62 Therefore, the executor asserted,
the orphans' court properly allowed the disclaimer.6"
The commonwealth court stated that the issue of whether a
disclaimer of a survivorship interest in jointly held personalty is
valid for inheritance tax purposes was a case of first impression
for the court.6" The court first noted that the list of
disclaimable property interests in section 6201 of the Probate
Code is not exclusive and could include other types of inter-
ests. 65 However, the court was ultimately persuaded by the
reasoning of the orphans' court, which noted that a joint tenant
657. Bernecker, 654 A.2d at 248.
658. Id.
659. Id. Section 6201 of the Probate Code provides:
[A] person to whom an interest in property would have devolved by whatever
means, including a beneficiary under a will, an appointee under the exercise
of a power of appointment, a person entitled to take by intestacy, a donee of
an inter vivos transfer, a donee under a third-party beneficiary contract (in-
cluding beneficiaries of life insurance and annuity policies and pension, profit-
sharing and other employee benefit plans), and a person entitled to a dis-
claimed interest, may disclaim it in whole or part by a written disclaimer.
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6201 (1992).
660. Bernecker, 654 A.2d at 248.
661. Id.
662. Id. The executor asserted that no material prejudice would result to any
creditors, heirs, or beneficiaries if the disclaimer were allowed, because all known
debts of both estates had been paid and he was the only beneficiary. Id. See supra
note 652 for the text of section 6202 of the Probate Code.
663. Bernecker, 654 A-2d at 248.
664. Id.
665. Id. See supra note 659 for the text of section 6201 of the Probate Code.
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with a right of survivorship has the unilateral right to sever the
joint tenancy.6" The court concluded that a logical extension of
this right allows a surviving joint tenant, or the survivor's per-
sonal representative, to terminate a survivorship interest by
filing a disclaimer."7
The court also noted that three federal courts of appeal cases,
which had analyzed the identical issue of a disclaimer of a sur-
vivorship interest in order to avoid state and federal inheritance
taxes, also concluded that such a disclaimer is effective under
both federal and state law.6" Therefore, the court held that the
survivorship interest of a deceased joint tenant qualifies as a
distributive share of the estate of an earlier deceased joint ten-
ant, and may be disclaimed for inheritance tax purposes under
section 9116(c) of the Tax Act.69
The court's ruling in Bernecker follows directly from the right
of one joint tenant to sever the joint tenancy without seeking
permission from the other joint tenants. The court's decision
recognizes that removing that right immediately upon the death
of one of the joint tenants, which may occur with little or no
notice, would abruptly eliminate one of a joint tenant's basic
rights. However, with the decision in Bernecker, a surviving joint
tenant now has greater flexibility to favorably dispose of the
jointly held property and avoid potential tax liability.
X. Property Law
PROPERTY LAW-EASEMENTS-DE FACTO TAKING--SUBSEQUENT
AGREEMENT, USE AND ACQUIESCENCE-REASONABLE AND NECES-
SARY USE-Zettlemoyer v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp.,
657 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1995)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that in an ambiguous easement, width is to be determined by a
necessary and reasonable use standard that effectuates the
purpose of the original grant as to the original parties.
In Zettlemoyer v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp.,670 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that in an ambiguous ease-
666. Bernecker, 654 A.2d at 248 (citations omitted).
667. Id.
668. Id. at 249 (citing Estate of Dancy v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 84 (4th Cir.
1989), McDonald v. Commissioner, 853 F.2d 1494 (8th Cir. 1988) and Kennedy v.
Commissioner, 804 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1986)).
669. Id.
670. 657 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1995).
631
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ment, width is to be determined by a necessary and reasonable
use standard that effectuates the purpose of the original grant
as to the original parties. 71
In Zettlemoyer, Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp.
("Transco") purchased a pipeline right-of-way across property
owned by Serfas Lumber Co. ("Serfas").672 Under the agree-
ment between Transco and Serfas, Transco cleared a 100 foot-
wide right-of-way in 1958.73 Transco constructed pipelines in
1958, 1971 and 1991.674 Transco, in constructing the third
pipeline, found it necessary to clear an additional thirty feet of
woods so that construction equipment could safely maneuver
around the other two pipelines. 75
The Zettlemoyers obtained portions of the land from Serfas by
deed beginning in 1958.17' However, the Zettlemoyers took title
to the property subject to the right-of-way held by Transco."'
. In 1991, the Zettlemoyers filed a petition for an appointment
of viewers 78 in the court of common pleas claiming that
Transco's act of clearing the additional thirty feet of woods con-
stituted a de facto condemnation 9  and therefore, the
Zettlemoyers were entitled to additional compensation."0 The
court of common pleas dismissed the Zettlemoyers' action and
671. Zettlemoyer, 657 A-2d at 922.
672. Id. Transco constructs natural gas lines and transports natural gas. Id.
673. Id. The agreement stated in pertinent part:
[Transco] shall have all other rights and benefits necessary for the full enjoy-
ment or use of the rights herein granted, including, but without limiting the
same to, the free and full right of ingress, egress and regress over and across
said lands and other lands of the grantor to and from said right from time to
time to cut and remove all trees, undergrowth and other obstructions that
may injure, endanger or interfere with the construction, operation, mainte-
nance and repair of said pipelines ....
Id.
674. Id. In August of 1958, the first pipeline was constructed. Id. In August of
1971, the second pipeline was constructed twenty-five feet from the original pipeline.
Id. Transco cleared an additional thirty feet of woods, beyond the original 100 feet,
in order to construct the third pipeline in 1991. Id.
675. Id.
676. Zettlernoyer, 657 A.2d at 922.
677. Id.
678. Id. A board of viewers is comprised of "[plersons appointed by a court to
make an investigation of certain matters ... and to report to the court the result
of their inspection, with their opinion on the same." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1568
(6th ed. 1990).
679. Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 923. A de facto condemnation occurs when "the
entity clothed with the power of eminent domain substantially deprives an owner of
the use and enjoyment of his property." Id. (citing Griggs v. Allegheny County, 168
A.2d 123, 124 (1961) (holding that the County would not be liable for appropriation
of adjacent land to airport from take-off and landing activities over the land), rev'd
on other grounds, 369 U.S. 84 (1962)).
680. Id.
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held that the additional thirty feet was necessary for the stated
purpose of Transco.68' The commonwealth court reversed the
trial court and held that Transco had established the easement
at 100 feet for over thirty years and Transco could not arbitrari-
ly change that distance without compensating the
Zettlemoyers.5 2
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur" to
clarify the standard for ambiguous easements."M The supreme
court noted the language of the agreement that unambiguously
granted Transco the right to construct the third pipeline.'
However, the supreme court noted, the agreement was ambigu-
ous as to the exact width of the easement.'M The supreme
court noted prior case law that addressed the issue of ambiguous
widths in easements.6 7 The court concluded that prior case
law has established that when an easement is ambiguous as to
width, it must be determined whether the asserted use is rea-
sonable and necessary as compared to the original purpose of
the easement."M
The court stated that the clearing of the additional thirty feet
of woods by Transco was within the intended purpose of the
easement between the original parties."M5 The court commented
that the Zettlemoyers based their argument on the theory that
Transco was limited to the 100 foot wide right-of-way because of
Transco's subsequent agreement, use and acquiescence. 90 The
court, in response to the argument advanced by the
Zettlemoyers, stated that as a matter of law subsequent
681. See Zettlemoyer, No. 2772 Civil 1991, slip op. at 6 (C.P. Monroe Cty. Feb.
20, 1992) (holding that the act of clearing the additional tract of land was necessary
for the use and enjoyment of the right of way).
682. Zettlemoyer v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 617 A.2d 51 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992) (holding that the maintenance of an easement at 100 feet for
thirty three years establishes the use and extent of the agreement; and therefore,
expansion of the easement would necessitate further compensation), rev'd, 657 A.2d
920 (Pa. 1995).
683. Allocatur is defined as a "word . . . used to denote that a writ or order
was allowed." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
684. Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 923.
685. Id.
686. Id. at 924.
687. Id. at 924-25. See Lease v. Doll, 403 A.2d 558 (Pa. 1979) (holding that
when the width of an easement is not specified in an agreement, the width will be
determined by what is suitable and convenient for the use of free passage).
688. Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 924.
689. Id. at 925. The court stated: "We find that the clear language of the
agreement is evidence of the original intent of the parties to allow Transco to clear
additional land where such clearing is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose




agreement, use and acquiescence does not determine width
when an agreement is ambiguous.9 '
The court concluded that when an easement is ambiguous, as
in Zettlemoyer, the grantee shall have use of the right-of-way
that is reasonable and necessary to fulfill the intent of the origi-
nal agreement. 9" In so concluding, the supreme court reversed
the decision of the commonwealth court and reinstated the order
of the court of common pleas.69
The supreme court's decision in Zettlemoyer clarifies the stan-
dard to be utilized in determining width in an ambiguous ease-
ment. The holding does not give grantees full license to exploit
an easement, but rather, limits grantees to the necessary and
reasonable use of the easement.
691. Id.
692. Id. at 926.
693. Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 927.
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